OVERVIEW:

While ISIS is on the defensive in Syria and Iraq,  ISIS’s Afghanistan branch Wilayat Khorasan (IS-K) has been expanding operations.  The group has been recruiting all over Afghanistan and has clashed with both the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan government (Kheel, 2015).

There are reports of an IS-K presence in other parts of Afghanistan, however the group has primarily gained a foothold in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar Province. Nangarhar has a tumultuous history as a former Taliban and al-Qaeda stronghold. It is also home to the notorious Tora Bora cave complex where Osama Bin-Laden was suspected to be hiding in 2001.

The term “Khorasan” refers to a historical region that includes portions of Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Eastern Iran and NW Pakistan. The exact borders claimed by ISIS are not entirely clear as of yet. Wilayat Khorasan only operates openly in Afghanistan, though they are likely active in Pakistan as well. Pakistan denies that ISIS has any presence in the country, despite several Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commanders switching allegiance to ISIS in 2014 (Al-Bawaba, 2015; Sherazi, 2014). Wilayat Khorasan has released videos of them targeting Pakistani military positions with mortars and SPg-9 recoilless rifles in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) Province, further suggesting ISIS presence in NW Pakistan.

ISIS’s exact arrival to Nangarhar or Afghanistan as a whole is unclear, however ISIS propaganda pamphlets appeared in Pakistan and Afghanistan around September, 2014 (Times of India, 2014). Initially, Wilayat Khorasan fighters appeared to be aligned with the Afghan Taliban, with the Afghan Taliban and IS-K linked fighters conducting a joint attack in Ghazni Province leading to the deaths of 100 people in late September 2014 (Rahim and Smith, 2014). An anti-government militant (named Qari Amandullah) was arrested by Afghan Security forces under suspicion of having ISIS links in December 2014 (Khaama Press, 2014). Wilayat Khorasan was officially confirmed to be recruiting in Afghanistan and Pakistan during January, 2015 (Tan, 2015). The situation continued to escalate from there with IS-K clashing outright with the Taliban and gaining a foothold in Nangarhar Province and neighboring Kunar Province.

HOW IS WILAYAT KHORASAN GAINING GROUND IN AFGHANISTAN?

IS-K seems to be taking key steps to differentiate itself from the Taliban, they have accused the Taliban of being “agents of Pakistan” as well as calling (then leader) Mullah Omar a “warlord” (Quraishi and Doran, 2015). IS-K also pays ($700 a month is one estimate) more than double of what the Taliban or the Afghan government pay (Ackerman, 2010; Quraishi and Doran, 2015). Furthermore, extreme brutality and violence seems to be a recruiting tactic, IS-K released a video of them executing village elders (some of whom were Taliban) through forcing them to kneel on an IED. This type of execution isn’t common in Afghanistan with execution by beheading or shooting being more common.

They also appear to be stricter in regards to enforcing their interpretation of Sharia in Afghanistan. Unlike the Taliban, IS-K has burned opium fields as well as banned cigarettes. They also set up their own school systems in areas they control. These schools largely serve the purpose of brainwashing students and preparing them to fight for the group. IS-K propaganda is generally high quality, especially when compared to the Afghan Taliban’s propaganda. Wilayat Khorasan even operates a radio station in Eastern Nangarhar (Shakib, 2015). Khorasan’s sleeker propaganda is one major factor in driving their spread in Afghanistan.

While Wilayat Khorasan may have some 70 core fighters from Syria and Iraq, the majority of its fighters are likely from Afghanistan or Pakistan (Khaama, 2015). As a result of the Pakistani Military’s offensives against the TTP many fighters fled into Afghanistan, some of which pledged allegiance to ISIS. The fighters from Pakistan in IS-K appear to be exclusively Pashtun ex-TTP.

Unlike the Afghan Taliban, Wilayat Khorasan appears to have significant non-Pashtun members. For instance, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) pledged allegiance to ISIS and joined Wilayat Khorasan, giving them Uzbek, Tajik, Uyghur, and Kyrgyz fighters. IS-K also has a few European and Saudi members (Quraishi and Doran, 2015). As of September, 2015 Wilayat Khorasan has approximately 2,000 fighters, of which 500 are former IMU fighters (O’Donnell, 2015).

ISIS IN NANGARHAR PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN

While Wilayat Khorasan  has a presence in many parts of Afghanistan, it has consolidated control of certain districts of Nangarhar Province. IS-K also has a presence in Kunar Province along the notorious Durand line bordering the Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and KPK Province. Fierce fighting between IS-K and the Taliban in Nangarhar has led to thousands of people fleeing to the provincial capital of Jalalabad.

While Wilayat Khorasan has mostly been active in rural areas of Nangarhar it has shown an ability to conduct operations in Jalalabad with a likely IS-K suicide attack killing 35 in April (Dearden, 2015). Wilayat Khorasan commanders claimed responsibility for that attack, then ISIS subsequently released a press release denying that it had conducted it. This indicates a possible disconnect between Wilayat Khorasan and ISIS central’s media team.

The degree of control ISIS Central has over Wilayat Khorasan is not exactly known. However, in November, 2015 Afghan forces claimed to have destroyed a Wilayat Khorasan radio base in Nangarhar (Mukhopadhyay, 2015). That radio base was apparently used by IS-K to communicate with ISIS central in Syria and Iraq. Wilayat Khorasan has also released several propaganda videos. These videos show well armed and trained fighters wearing matching uniforms (unusual among most militants in Afghanistan).

The style and quality of these propaganda videos suggest that Wilayat Khorasan is not editing the video by itself, but with the likely assistance of ISIS Central’s Al-Hayat Media Center. This suggests at least some coordination between ISIS Central and IS-K. Ultimately, the majority of fighters in Wilayat Khorasan are still fighters from Pakistan/Afghanistan that have simply switched allegiance from the Afghan Taliban/TTP to ISIS. Fighters that have directly come from Syria/Iraq or elsewhere are a minority among the group. Thus many see Wilayat Khorasan as simply a rebranding of existing militants. However, unlike the Afghan Taliban, Wilayat Khorasan poses a threat to other countries in South and Central Asia.

As a part of Operation Resolute Support, the US has been conducting airstrikes against both Wilayat Khorasan and the Taliban in Nangarhar province. The majority of strikes seem to have been in the Achin district of Nangarhar Province. US drone strikes during July in Achin district killed Gul Zaman, the 2nd in command of Wilayat Khorasan (Adeel, 2015). Shahidullah Shahid, an ex-TTP spokesperson who had pledged allegiance to ISIS, was killed in US drone strikes in eastern Nangarhar province in July as well (Adeel, 2015). Claims that the leader of Wilayat Khorasan Hafiz Saeed Khan was killed in the July Achin District airstrikes have been denied by Wilayat Khorasan. IS-K released audio recordings of Hafiz Saeed Khan as proof that he survived the airstrikes, however these have not been verified and that status of Wilayat Khorasan’s leader is unclear as of now.

CONCLUSION:

ISIS in Afghanistan has surpassed the stage where it was an incipient group and now has shown the ability to directly challenge and displace the Taliban in certain districts. Wilayat Khorasan is well funded, well equipped and has a highly effective propaganda wing. These factors increase the appeal of ISIS to disillusioned, underpaid Taliban fighters. Significant effort needs to be taken by the Afghan government and the members of Operation Resolute Support to combat and contain Wilayat Khorasan. Furthermore, Pakistan must work to further secure the border with Afghanistan to prevent ex-TTP fighters from simply slipping into Afghanistan and joining IS-K. Without these efforts there is a significant risk that Wilayat Khorasan could eventually threaten Jalalabad, the capital of Nangarhar Province. The citations for this post are available here for download in PDF form.