OVERVIEW:

On 25th December 2015, Zahran Alloush (the leader of Jaish al-Islam) was killed in a Syrian Air Force (SyAAF) airstrike on a meeting of senior rebel leadership in a Jaish al-Islam (JaI) HQ in East Ghouta (Hazem, 2015).

The airstrikes were a targeted attack; unnamed SAA sources indicate that “Damascus knew about the location of the meeting 48 hours before it occurred” (Magnier, 2015). Furthermore, aerial footage of the airstrikes suggest that drones were used to monitor the meeting location (SANA, 2015). The footage suggests that the drone was an Orlan-10 (A Russian made surveillance drone), leading to speculation that this was a Russian airstrike. However, Russian media has confirmed that this was a Syrian operation and Syrian Government sources confirm this as well (RussiaToday, 2015; SANA, 2015). 

THE CASUALTIES:

The airstrikes led to the deaths of 15 commanders in total in addition to Zahran Alloush; 7 belonging to Ahrar al-Sham and 8 to Jaish al-Islam and Faylaq al-Rahman (Syria24, 2015; Magnier, 2015).  The names of all the commanders are not known, however 2 key commanders are confirmed dead.

Furthermore,  unconfirmed reports have surfaced that Zahran Alloush’s brother “Mahmoud,” and possibly his eldest son “Mohammad” were killed in the airstrikes (Magnier, 2015). Mahmoud was reportedly a deputy commander in Jaish al-Islam (Magnier, 2015). Contrary to initial reports, Jaish al-Islam’s spokesperson Hamza Biraqdar survived the airstrikes. The losses to JaI are severe with significant portions of its senior leadership killed; Faylaq al-Rahman’s leadership was also heavily affected by the airstrike (Lund, 2015). The losses to Ahrar al-Sham are less significant with only minor commanders killed.

THE IMPACT OF ALLOUSH’S DEATH:

Zahran Alloush was a key rebel leader not only in E. Ghouta but in Syria as a whole. Alloush had a media and political presence that was lacking among other Islamist groups in Syria. Alloush interacted with both western and local media, as well as traveling to Turkey in April, 2015 to meet with other rebel leaders to discuss the war in Syria. Many view Alloush as trying to tone down the sectarian rhetoric of Jaish al-Islam in an attempt to secure further backing from Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Interviews conducted with Alloush in May, 2015 (where he stated that he supports minority rights) contrast starkly with statements issued early in the year where he advocated for ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Syrian Alawite community (MPC Journal, 2015).

Jaish al-Islam has a fairly robust chain of command and is known for being extremely well organized compared to other rebel groups in Syria. Following the death of Alloush, JaI announced Issam al-Boudani (also known as “Abu Hammam Baidhani”) as their new leader. Not much is known about Boudani. His twitter account has been active since April, 2015 (though he tweets very infrequently). Unconfirmed sources suggest Boudani is a 40 year old ex-businessman from the Boudani neighborhood in Douma (DPA International, 2015). He was also very close to Alloush (reportedly Boudani was Alloush’s deputy) and had ties with the Muslim Brotherhood (DPA International, 2015).

It is uncertain if Boudani will take the group in a different direction than Alloush or if he can keep control of Jaish al-Islam at all. However, other rebel groups have rebounded from even more significant leadership losses. Ahrar al-Sham’s entire senior leadership was wiped out in 2014 (BBC, 2014). Despite this, the group managed to survive and become stronger in 2015. Jaish al-Islam’s chain of command is likely more organized than Ahrar’s (JaI has a reputation for being well structured and fairly professional). It is entirely unclear what effect these events will have on Saudi and Turkish backing of rebel groups.

CONCLUSION: 

The death of Alloush and others come at an extremely bad time for both Jaish al-Islam and the Syrian rebels as a whole. Syrian government offensives against the rebels have been fairly successful with the SAA gaining ground on many fronts. Furthermore, increased involvement of Russia in supporting the Syrian government through airstrikes, and lukewarm US support for FSA groups has put the rebels in a perilous position. The US appears to focusing more on supporting the SDF and defeating ISIS than forcing Assad out. Ultimately, unless Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other states increase support of rebel groups in Syria, the Syrian rebels will have a tough time holding their ground against the SAA. Citations for this post are available here for download in PDF form.