American support for rebel groups in Syria is not a new story. The U.S. has backed a variety of rebel groups in Syria in their fight against the Syrian government and ISIS. After the much publicized collapse of the U.S. trained Division 30 at the hands of al-Nusra Front, there have been few public statements from government agencies specifying which groups are currently being armed or trained. In recent months the rebels around Azaz in Northern Aleppo Governorate seem to be increasingly supported by Turkey and the US.
A map of rebel held territory in Northern Aleppo near Azaz on March 14th, 2016 (@ValkryV, 2016)
The rebel groups in this North Aleppo pocket are cut off from Syrian Government territory, and while they have clashed with the Kurdish YPG and other members of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The U.S. seems to have intervened and tried to broker a truce between rebels and the YPG in this area, though it remains to be seen if this will have any effect. In either case, the rebel groups that operate in Northern Aleppo Governorate will be a key factor in securing the Turkish border and removing ISIS from the area.
In this write-up we will be examining al-Moutasem Brigade (Arabic: لواء المعتصم); they are an FSA group that operates in Northern Aleppo Governorate around Azaz. The group is relatively new to the war in Syria; al-Moutasem’s videos first appeared on the internet in November, 2015. In recent months they have drastically increased in activity and size with multiple pickup trucks and heavy machine guns. Furthermore, video and photographic evidence we have gathered suggests they are backed by the U.S.
An al-Moutasem fighter with the group’s flag (note his plate carrier is designed to carry STANAG NATO magazines)
SMALL ARMS USAGE:
Al-Moutasem Brigade uses a variety of American weapons and gear. While it is possible that some were purchased on the black market, the sheer number of American weapons that the group uses suggests that they were supplied these weapons. Logistics is a key factor in determining whether these groups are American backed. NATO ammunition is not common in Syria and supplying expensive smuggled NATO ammunition would be expensive and too costly for a group of al-Moutasem’s size.
Al-Moutasem has been spotted using multiple M16A2 rifles and at least one M16A2 with an ACOG scope. While the number of M16A2 rifles the group has is suggestive of foreign backing, it is not conclusive proof since significant numbers of M16A2 rifles are available on the black market. Furthermore, Turkey and a variety of other countries in the Middle East use the M16A2. Thus, the appearance of such a large number of M16A2 rifles with the group may point to foreign backing, but it does not necessarily point to explicit American backing of the group. However, the M16A2s combined with other evidence does suggest American backing.
A fighter from the al-Moutasem Brigade prepares to fire his M16A2An M16A2 with an ACOG scope being used by an al-Moutasem Brigade fighter
Moving on to light and medium machine guns, al-Moutasem has several machine guns that point towards U.S. backing. The group has at least two M249 Light Machine Guns (LMG). The M249 LMG fires 5.56x45mm NATO ammunition using an M27 disintegrating link ammunition belt. The logistics involved in supplying ammunition for the M249 are certainly beyond the means of a small group like al-Moutasem. Most likely a foreign backer is supplying them with that ammunition. Furthermore, Al-Moutasem’s M249s have been upgraded with a SAVIT corporation “para-style” adjustable stock. This is the same stock used in the U.S. Paratrooper variant of the M249.
A M249 LMG with a “para-style” adjustable stock and an added forward hand grip being used by al-Moutasem BrigadeA fighter from al-Moutasem Brigade fires his M249 LMG that has been modified with a “para-style” adjustable stock (note the disintegrating M-27 belt)
Finally, the al-Moutasem Brigade has been spotted firing an M240B (7.62x51mm NATO) Medium Machine Gun (MMG). While the M240B is used by Iraqi Special Operations Forces, it is still an incredibly uncommon weapon in the Middle East as a whole. The presence of this weapon among such a small rebel group clearly points to American support.
A two man MMG team from al-Moutasem Brigade engages ISIS positions using a M240B
MORTARS AND VEHICLE USAGE:
Al-Moutasem Brigade like many other groups in Syria owns a variety of mortar tubes of various sizes. What is unusual however is the presence of American mortar systems with the group. They have been spotted using the M224 60mm mortar, M252 81mm mortar and M120 120mm mortar on several occasions.
A M252 mortar, M120 mortar and M224 mortar being used by al-Moutasem Brigade (from front to back)
Al-Moutasem usually uses mortar rounds that have “cheese charge” or “ring” style mortar propellant charges. This style of mortar propellant is common in American mortar round designs. This style of mortar round is not very common in Syria where the “bag style” mortar propellant charges are more commonly seen.
A fighter from al-Moutasem loading a mortar round that has “ring” style propellant charges
Al-Moutasem has several “technicals” some of which are mounted with American .50cal M2HB heavy machine guns. “Technicals” refer to pickup trucks mounted with machine guns or other heavy weaponry. The group has at least 5 pickup trucks mounted with M2HB HMGs and they have a number of other pickup trucks equipped with other heavy machine guns. The presence of the M2HB machine gun points to American backing. Furthermore, these guns are mounted using an American manufactured MK93 mount. This shock absorbing mount is used by the U.S. military to mount .50 cal M2HB machine guns on vehicles as well.
An al-Moutasem “technical” armed with a M2HB machine gun (note the number of modifications and aftermarket additions to the truck)
The spare tire mounted on the rear of the “technical” as seen above is of particular interest. Later on in the video we get a closer look at the tire and learn it is a BF Goodrich brand tire. Furthermore, the tread pattern in the video matches the tread pattern seen on BF Goodrich All Terrain TA/KO2 tires.
Al-Moutasem’s spare tire
All Terrain TA/KO2 Tread Pattern
This tread pattern is not available in Syria or any of the Middle East and is a fairly new tread pattern (released in late 2014). We were unable to find evidence of this tire tread pattern being sold anywhere other than the US, Mexico, Canada, the UK and Ireland. The presence of this tread pattern in Syria along with brand new 2014 Toyota Hiluxes, American M2HB Browning machine guns and complex recoil compensating gun carriers certainly points towards American involvement.
CONCLUSION:
While the presence of these American weapons and other equipment may not prove American support for al-Moutasem individually, together they paint a clear picture that al-Moutasem Brigade is backed and armed by the United States. In addition to this, there is unconfirmed video evidence that the U.S. supports al-Moutasem in their fight against ISIS through providing close air support. We were unable to verify the authenticity of the footage, but with the level of U.S. support that al-Moutasem has received it would not be surprising if this was the case.
Fighters point towards an A-10 Warthog that may have been providing close air support to rebels including al-Moutasem Brigade
In either case, it is clear that the U.S. government remains committed to training Syrian rebel groups for the fight against ISIS. The al-Moutasem Brigade is just one of many US backed groups that have begun to appear in Northern Aleppo Governorate and elsewhere in Syria. The collapse of the U.S. backed Division 30 at the hands of al-Nusra Front has not stopped American efforts to arm Syrian rebel groups in their fight against ISIS. The al-Moutasem Brigade will clearly be a key player in the defeat of ISIS in Northern Aleppo Governorate.
(This write-up was created with assistance from Twitter users @PurpleCombatMod and @The_Groundview, feel free to follow them on Twitter for updates on the situation in the Middle East and Syria)
Jaish al-Islam (Arabic: جيش الإسلام) or “Army of Islam” has a reputation for being a competent group. While the group is backed by Turkey and Saudi Arabia, its success cannot be wholly attributed to its foreign backing (Oweis, 2013). A variety of rebel groups in Syria ranging from the Southern Front of the Free Syrian Army to Ahrar al-Sham are backed by foreign powers, yet none of these groups have come close to emulating Jaish al-Islam’s (JaI) management of the local economy.
Ideologically the group adheres to Salafi Islamism, but they have shown a degree of flexibility in their outlook. Unlike al-Qaeda or ISIS, Jaish al-Islam does not seek to expand their rule to countries other than Syria. Furthermore, unlike Ahrar al-Sham, JaI has lukewarm relations with Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda’s Syrian Branch). For instance, in June 2015, Jabhat al-Nusra’s attempt to expand their Jaish al-Fatah coalition to East Ghouta was rejected by JaI and other allied groups (Zaman al-Wasl, 2015). A month later in July, minor clashes between JaI and al-Nusra erupted in E. Ghouta over the arrests of a Nusra member by a local court (Abo_M0hamed, 2015; Uygaraktas, 2015). These clashes eventually were resolved only after several small attacks on each other’s checkpoints had occurred (Abduhark, 2015). While JaI and al-Nusra are not actively hostile to each other per se, these events highlight their somewhat uneasy relationship. Jaish al-Islam’s distance from al-Nusra makes the group somewhat more palatable for Saudi Arabia and Turkey to support.
A Document from E. Ghouta ‘s United Military Council (including JaI) rejecting the creation of Jabhat al-Nusra’s Jaish al-Fatah coalition in E. Ghouta
JaI operates in a fairly tough environment in their stronghold of E. Ghouta; they are cut off from core rebel territories in Idlib/Aleppo Governorate and Darra Governorate. They are also under a crippling Syrian government siege that restricts the flow of supplies and food into their territories. Despite this situation, Jaish al-Islam manages to remain one of the most professional rebel groups in Syria. Jaish al-Islam’s management of the economy in E. Ghouta is a major factor in their continued survival while under siege.
Ammunition, food, water, weaponry, support population and funding are all required to successfully conduct military operations. Without these key factors, JaI would be unable to operate as successfully as they do. In this write-up we will be analyzing the various factors that allow Jaish al-Islam to survive in E. Ghouta on the doorstep of the Syrian government.
SMUGGLING AND TUNNELING
Smuggling is a key factor in allowing Jaish al-Islam to survive under siege in East Ghouta. Bribery and graft within pro-government forces allows Jaish al-Islam to move goods into the East Ghouta pocket. Corrupt SAA (Syrian Arab Army) officers are known to sell supplies and weaponry to Jaish al-Islam at inflated rates. For instance, Jaish al-Islam bought two T-72 tanks from a corrupt SAA officer back in 2014 (Oryx, 2014). According to Siege Watch, in the Damascus area only Douma and Jobar are under complete siege with little to no transfer of goods and supplies from across government lines. However, the vast majority of the other sieges in E. Ghouta are not ranked as “Tier 1” sieges according to Siege Watch; this indicates that some passage of supplies from government areas into rebel areas occurs.
Jaish al-Islam also operates several underground smuggling tunnels in the area. The suburb of Jobar, for instance, is linked to E. Ghouta through a network of tunnels. These tunnels reduce the effectiveness of the near total government siege on Jobar. Other tunnel networks allow the transfer of supplies into E. Ghouta and allow Jaish al-Islam’s leadership to leave and enter the E. Ghouta pocket at will. For example, Jaish al-Islam’s former leader (now deceased) Zahran Alloush was able to travel from E. Ghouta to Istanbul, Turkey despite the Syrian government blockade. The network of tunnels crisscrossing under E. Ghouta makes it extremely hard for the Syrian government to totally blockade areas they are besieging.
Jaish al-Islam also uses tunneling as an offensive weapon to launch surprise attacks from behind enemy lines. The lead-up to the 2015 Tal Kurdi Offensive by Jaish al-Islam saw the construction of several infiltration tunnels. These tunnels are often large, well lit and equipped with air flow systems. Some tunnels were large enough to comfortably allow the transport of dozens of fighters.
One of the Jaish al-Islam infiltration tunnels used to successfully attack from behind SAA lines in the 2015 Tal Kurdi Offensive
UNCONVENTIONAL ARTILLERY AND MUNITIONS MANUFACTURING
Jaish al-Islam makes a variety of munitions for use in combat. While most rebel groups in Syria are limited to manufacturing improvised items such as IEDs or homemade grenades, Jaish al-Islam takes this a step further to manufacturing standardized munitions. However, Jaish al-Islam does manufacture a variety of non-standard munitions including the infamous “hell cannon” (for more about “hell cannons” read this this). In summary, “hell cannons” are essentially an improvised mortar of sorts firing an improvised projectile usually consisting of a propane tank packed with explosives.
A Jaish al-Islam “Hell Cannon” (note the usage of sandbags to reduce movement of the cannon during firing)
Jaish al-Islam also makes and uses improvised rocket artillery called IRAMs (Improvised Rocket Assisted Munitions). This style of improvised rocket artillery was popularized by various Shia militias that used them against American forces during the insurgency phase of the Iraq War (Roggio, 2008). IRAMs are essentially an oversized improvised warhead (usually a propane tank or drum filled with explosives and shrapnel) attached to a small rocket motor. When compared to most standard rocket artillery, IRAMs are relatively short range (mostly due to their large oversized warhead). They are also notoriously inaccurate due to their unconventional shape. IRAMs have a variety of names including “lob bombs” and aerial improvised explosive device (AIED). While Jaish al-Islam IRAMs tend to be less impressive and generally weaker than the infamous “volcano rockets” used by the SAA, IRAMs are still an important armament in Jaish al-Islam’s arsenal.
A Jaish al-Islam truck mounted with a dual IRAM system used to bombard the Syrian government controlled town of al-Zahraa in July, 2015A Jaish al-Islam IRAM takes flight from a stationary metal platform
IEDs (improvised explosive device) are also a common non-standard munition utilized by Jaish al-Islam. Jaish al-Islam seems to employ IEDs in ambushes; they also use IEDs to shut down Syrian government usage of roads. For instance, Jaish al-Islam has repeatedly employed IEDs to try to shut down Syrian government usage of the M5 highway between Damascus and Homs. Jaish al-Islam does not seem to manufacture IEDs on a large scale. Furthermore, Jaish al-Islam does not appear to use IEDs at frequently as ISIS or other rebel groups.
Syrian government fighters walking into a Jaish al-Islam IED ambush (note the use of a surveillance camera to coordinate the ambush timing)A Jaish al-Islam IED goes off on the M5 Highway
Improvised grenades are also manufactured by Jaish al-Islam. These improvised grenades are rather small and almost exclusively rely on an external fuse that must be manually lit with a lighter or match prior to usage. This style of improvised grenade is incredibly common across Syria among a variety of non-state actors ranging from small FSA groups to ISIS. The effectiveness of these improvised grenades is unclear due to the lack of standardization among grenade designs.
A Jaish al-Islam fighter preparing to throw an improvised grenade near the outer walls of Adra Prison during Jaish al-Islam’s Tal Kurdi Offensive in September, 2015A Jaish al-Islam fighter about to throw a small improvised grenade
CONVENTIONAL ARTILLERY MANUFACTURING
While Jaish al-Islam’s IRAMs and hell cannons may be quite effective, Jaish al-Islam’s manufacturing of conventional artillery systems is what makes it stand out among the various rebel groups in Syria. Jaish al-Islam makes or modifies a variety of conventional artillery pieces that fire standard munitions. We will examine just a few of the conventional artillery pieces that have been modified or built by Jaish al-Islam.
Modification of existing artillery pieces by rebel groups in Syria is quite common. Jaish al-Islam modifies a variety of artillery systems. For instance, they have upgraded Type-63 MLRS (Multiple Lauch Rocket System) with a more durable off-road chassis as well as adding a new camouflage paint-job (Oryx Blog, 2014).
Jaish al-Islam Type-63 107mm MLRS mounted on a modified off-road chassis (Oryx Blog, 2014)
Moving on to other types of rocket artillery, Jaish al-Islam has been spotted using a locally manufactured analog of the 9K132 Grad-P. This variant of the Grad is essentially a single tube that fires a single Grad rocket (FAS, 1999). This system allows for the firing of individual grad rockets in areas where a truck mounted grad system may not be useable. Jaish al-Islam’s Grad-P analog is extremely similar to the original system in both construction and design; furthermore, like the actual Grad-P, their Grad-P analog is man-portable.
Jaish al-Islam setting up their Grad-P Analog somewhere in the mountains of Latakia
Probably one of the pinnacles of Jaish al-Islam’s artillery manufacturing was the creation of the Sahm al-Islam 3 (Arabic: سهمالإسلام) MLRS. “Sahm al-Islam” translates to “Arrow of Islam,” which is a somewhat apt name given the three 122mm rockets that system is armed with. These rockets are launched from an elevating and rotating firing platform that is mounted onto a 6×6 Ural-375D. The Ural-375D is the vehicle used in the BM-21 Grad MLRS; thus, its use as an MLRS platform in Jaish al-Islam’s Sahm al-Islam 3 system is not strange. The Sahm al-Islam 3 MLRS can also carry up to two 122mm rockets in reserve.
Jaish al-Islam’s “Sahm al-Islam 3” MLRS
CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS MANUFACTURING
Jaish al-Islam makes a variety of conventional munitions as well. Jaish al-Islam used to control significant portions of Adra industrial city giving them access to significant amounts of machinery that could have been used for the production of munitions. Furthermore, there are a significant number of factories and foundries within Douma and other urban areas within East Ghouta.
Jaish al-Islam manufactures both mortar rounds and rockets. While they make a large variety of large and small caliber mortar rounds, they seem to only make 107mm and 122mm rockets. The 107mm rocket is seemingly designed to be fired from a Type-63 style MLRS. It is uncertain how effective or accurate these rockets are, though there are multiple videos from 2013 of their 122mm “Sahm al-Islam 3” rocket being successfully fired. It is unclear if these rockets are being produced on any significant scale by Jaish al-Islam. To the best of our knowledge, 122mm “Sahm al-Islam 3” rockets have not been seen since late 2013.
A variety of large and small Jaish al-Islam mortar rounds and a Jaish al-Islam 107mm rocket (Oryx Blog, 2014)
Unfortunately, we do not have insight on how these rockets are manufactured as we were unable to locate any videos of Jaish al-Islam manufacturing their rockets. However, Jaish al-Islam has released a video showcasing most of their process for manufacturing mortar rounds. The following slides roughly approximate the process they use to manufacture mortar rounds.
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Note that Jaish al-Islam uses sand casting to cast their mortar rounds; this is a standard process in the metal casting industry. It is likely that the group is employing workers that had experience with casting prior to the war. Several key steps of their manufacturing process are not shown; we do not know anything about the process of adding propellant, explosives, primers or fuzes to the mortar round. It is possible that they lack the capability to manufacture some or all of these components.
GENERAL SUPPLIES MANUFACTURING
Jaish al-Islam appears to make their own uniforms. While this is not particularly unusual among non-state actors (the LTTE for instance made their own camouflage uniforms), it is not common for camouflage uniforms to be manufactured on a large scale among rebel groups in Syria. While all Jaish al-Islam fighters do not wear standardized uniforms, high level leadership and special forces tend to wear them. Jaish al-Islam not only makes camouflage pants and shirts, they also make standardized boots for their soldiers.
A Jaish al-Islam run clothing factory in East GhoutaJaish al-Islam fighters wearing standardized hats, uniforms and bootsBoots being made at a Jaish al-Islam run factory
Jaish al-Islam also appears to make their own saline solution for usage as intravenous fluid in hospitals and on the battlefield. While the group does have a fairly well developed medical corp, we were unable to find any video footage showing the actual production process for saline. The video showcasing the saline solution did show the usage of a sterilizing machine, but it is unclear if that was relevant to the production of saline solution.
Jaish al-Islam branded saline solution
ANTI-MATERIEL RIFLE AND SNIPER RIFLE MANUFACTURING
Jaish al-Islam manufactures a large variety of sniper and anti-materiel rifles. In addition to allowing the engagement of targets far outside the range of most small arms, these rifles can also easily destroy weaponry, supplies, and unarmored vehicles. The use of large caliber machine guns in a sniper role is not uncommon; the Vietnam war saw the use of the .50 Caliber Browning M2 machine gun as a sniper and the 12.7mm Soviet NSV machine gun was re-purposed as a sniper during the Soviet War in Afghanistan (Eger, 2013).
A NSV machine gun being used in a sniper/anti-materiel role by Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan (Eger, 2013)
Jaish al-Islam seems to repurpose barrels from machine guns and anti-aircraft guns to make their anti-materiel rifles. These weapons seem to be effective and several videos have been released of them accurately targeting Syrian government forces. In some cases they appear to have manufactured the rifle barrel themselves, while in others they have simply reused a barrel from another weapon.
A 23mm Jaish al-Islam anti-materiel rifle built using what appears to be the barrel of a ZU-32 Anti-Aircraft Gun (Oryx Blog, 2014)A 12.7mm Jaish al-Islam sniper rifle built with what appears to be a re-purposed Chinese W-85 heavy machine gun barrelA large caliber Jaish al-Islam gun fitted with a likely homemade muzzle break
AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY
In Syria we have seen that siege tactics are a somewhat effective strategy to weaken the operational capability of a non-state actor. Both the Syrian government and the rebels have employed siege tactics through denying the passage of food, gasoline and other supplies to enemy controlled territory. Rebel held pockets under government blockade often face starvation and food insecurity. A particularly relevant example would be the Damascus suburb of Mouadamiya which is under a crippling government siege (Graham-Harrison and Shaheen, 2016). The “Mouadamiya Council,” which is in charge of running the city, has alleged that the government’s restriction of food supply to the suburb leads to much of the civilian population fleeing to government controlled areas. This also has the effect of weakening rebels who depend on the support of the civilian population to effectively operate.
E. Ghouta, however, has not experienced food insecurity or starvation to the scale seen in Mouadamiya. This is largely attributable to the rural nature of E. Ghouta and its enormous number of farms. Furthermore, Ghouta also benefits from having an enormous number of poultry farms and slaughter houses. On the other hand, urban areas under siege often can not produce sufficient food to feed its population. Therefore, Jaish al-Islam and other groups in E. Ghouta do not face the same food security pressures as rebels in besieged urban areas.
Aid workers from United Relief Office in East Ghouta prepare meat for distribution (East Ghouta is home to a variety of slaughter houses and poultry farms)
CONCLUSION
Jaish al-Islam is not your ordinary Syrian rebel group; while it may not have the large scale presence of Ahrar al-Sham or Jabhat al-Nusra, it is clearly one of the most well organized rebel groups in Syria. As far as conventional weapons and munitions manufacturing among non-state actors is concerned, Jaish al-Islam is by far the most successful at it. While it is quite clear that their heavy backing by Saudi Arabia and Turkey plays a significant role in their manufacturing capabilities, a large portion of the manufacturing equipment they use, such as forges, lathes and sterilization machines, are simply too large to have been smuggled in with the support of their foreign backers.
Jaish al-Islam’s management of the economy in East Ghouta plays a major role in the groups continued dominance among rebels in the Damascus area. Their ability to conduct massive coordinated offensives such as the 2015 Tal Kurdi Offensive is in part thanks to their ability to manufacture their own munitions. Jaish al-Islam is and will remain a major player within the Syrian Civil War for some time to come. Citations for this post are available in PDF form here.
This is the 3rd part of a 3 part series on ISIS in Afghanistan (Part 1 and 2 can be seen here and here respectively). In this write-up we will be analyzing Wilayat Khorasan’s (IS-K) propaganda. ISIS is known for having an extremely well developed media wing that produces an enormous amount of videos, magazines, and newspapers. ISIS has an understanding of media in a way that many other “traditional” jihadist groups never had. ISIS videos often feel like a Hollywood action film with slow motion explosions, combat, sleek graphics and an overall professional design. These videos are a far cry from the “lecture in front of a blank backdrop” style made famous by Osama bin Laden.
ISIS produces content in a variety of languages ranging from Mandarin Chinese to French. While the majority of ISIS propaganda is produced in Arabic, there has been an increase in Urdu, Pashto and Dari propaganda through late 2015 and early 2016. IS-K’s effectiveness at propaganda will partially dictate whether they can peel away fighters from the Afghan Taliban. Thus we will be analyzing the various types of propaganda used by IS-K, as well as discuss some of the strategy and rhetoric IS-K uses in its propaganda. To do this we must first define what IS-K considers to be its territory of “Khorasan.”
WHAT AREAS CONSTITUTE “KHORASAN”?
Khorasan is a historical region referring to one of the provinces of the Ummayad Caliphate. The term has its roots in Middle Persian; Khorasan means “land where the sun rises.” The term historically included parts of Iran, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan (Britannica, 2015).
One possible interpretation of the Khorasan region
Khorasan has a lot of significance among Salafi Jihadist groups. A variety of hadiths (collections of sayings about the prophet Muhammad) mention Khorasan. One hadith narrated on authority of Ibn Majah, Al-Hakim, Ahma states that “If you see the Black Banners coming from Khorasan go to them immediately, even if you must crawl over ice, because indeed amongst them is the Caliph, Al-Mahdi.” While the accuracy of this hadith is debated among Islamic scholars, many Salafi groups follow this viewpoint (Taylor, 2014). Al-Qaeda’s online magazine was called “Vanguards of Khorasan” and references to Khorasan are often sprinkled through a variety of Islamist literature (Taylor, 2014).
IS-K’s definition of what they consider to be part of Khorasan is unclear. In January, 2016 an interview in ISIS’s English magazine “Dabiq” with Hafiz Saeed Khan (the head of IS-K) shed some light on their claims. Khan confirmed that they considered Kashmir as part of their proclaimed Khorasan. Furthermore, Khan stated that China is occupying parts of Khorasan. He specifically mentions Turkistan (Xingjiang).
The front cover of the interview with Hafiz Saeed Khan from the 13th issue of ISIS’s English print magazine “Dabiq”
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan are likely included in the definition as well. The inclusion of parts of these territories in the historical Khorasan province of the Ummayad Caliphate supports this argument. Furthermore, IMU propaganda videos released after they joined ISIS still seem to mention Uzbekistan. While a small underground IS-K presence in Punjab and Sindh may exist (largely due to Jundallah joining IS-K), Khan specifies that “Western Pakistan” is included in Khorasan. Thus we can exclude Punjab and Sindh from the definition of Khorasan. Using this information we can map a possible interpretation as to what Khorasan’s claimed territory is.
A rough approximation of territories ISIS considers to be part of Khorasan
IS-K’s claimed territory of Khorasan is massive; it spans multiple countries and 10+ major languages. While Dari/Persian and Pashto are the two biggest languages in the region, Urdu is also a key lingua franca in Pakistan and Indian Kashmir. Consequently, IS-K propaganda tends to be primarily in Pashto, secondarily in Dari and thirdly in Urdu.
BRUTALITY IN PROPAGANDA AS A RECRUITMENT TACTIC
ISIS in general is known for using brutality as a factor in their propaganda. From the burning of a captured Jordanian pilot to throwing people off buildings, ISIS has a history of excessive brutality (CBSNews, 2015). It is possible this was partially an attempt to gain media exposure as well as to “1-up” other Jihadist groups. The killing of a Jordanian pilot in particular created a massive media storm. While the vast majority of reaction to this gruesome incident was negative, it still gave ISIS a larger audience and thus a larger base to recruit from. IS-K seems to be following a similar approach executing several Taliban and village elders with an IED. Such a method of execution is not common in Afghanistan and was reported on by many Afghan newspapers.
IS-K fighters preparing to execute the captured Taliban and village elders with an IED
IS-K’s brutality may be an attempt to lure younger, hot headed jihadists within the Taliban. The Afghan Taliban has been largely unsuccessful in its mission in overthrowing the Afghan government (though they have been increasingly successful at challenging the Government in recent times). Furthermore, after the death of Mullah Omar was revealed the Afghan Taliban has fractured significantly. IS-K’s brutality may attract hot headed jihadists that are disillusioned with the amount of infighting within the Taliban.
It is important to note that many times brutality may have the opposite effect. Excess brutality may alienate possible recruits or trigger a backlash from the public. IS-K has already experienced this when they executed Hazara civilians in Zabul Province during November, 2015 (Mashal and Shah, 2015). That execution sparked protests in Kabul and led to reprisals by the Taliban that crushed much of the IS-K presence in Zabul (SITE Intelligence Group, 2015). IS-K no longer has any major presence in Zabul due to this.
Afghans protest the killing of Hazara civilians by IS-K (REUTERS, 2015)
IS-K’s brutality also triggered backlash in the form of defections. Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, an ex-Guantanamo Bay detainee, pledged allegiance to the group and became a recruiter for IS-K (Joscelyn, 2015). He later revoked his pledge to the group stating that, “He [Hafiz Saeed Khan] unleashed cruelty, took the people to ignorance, violating Islamic injunctions and humiliated Afghans” (Khaama Press, 2015). It is unclear what net effect IS-K’s brutality has had on defections to the group.
IS-K’S RHETORIC AGAINST THE TALIBAN
IS-K’s rhetoric towards the Taliban generally revolves around pointing out their “un-islamic” practices. IS-K has accused the Afghan Taliban and the TTP as being agents of Pakistan on numerous occasions. In the Dabiq interview with Hafiz Saeed Khan the Taliban is described as being “Nationalist,” and that they “rule by tribal customs and judge affairs in accordance with the desires and tradition of the people, traditions opposing the Islamic Shari’ah.” This accusation is based on the fact that the Taliban relies heavily on Pashtunwali (the tribal code of Pashtuns) in its court systems. Accusations of nationalism are likely linked to the fact that the Afghan Taliban does not seek to expand beyond Afghanistan and is largely seen as being a group supported only by Pashtuns. IS-K also highlights the links between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Intelligence as another proof of the Taliban’s “unislamic” nature.
An IS-K commander in Kunar Province stating that “The Taliban take their orders from Pakistani Intelligence” in Frontline’s documentary about ISIS in Afghanistan (Quraishi and Doran, 2015)
IS-K also accuses the Taliban of dealing in opium stating that, “the Taliban themselves transport opium and heroin in their personal vehicles, charging a fee to the sellers and the addicts.” IS-K also states that, unlike the Taliban, they not only prohibit opium but cigarettes as well. Videos of IS-K burning cigarettes and opium have surfaced from Afghanistan. However, Afghan government sources state that IS-K wants access to the opium trade (Khaama, 2015). The majority of sources do seem to suggest that IS-K is destroying opium fields. Another interesting point is that despite having broken off from the Taliban, Khan seems to still have respect for the now deceased Mullah Omar. This is possibly done to avoid alienating Taliban who are on the fence about joining IS-K. Khan largely blames Akhtar Mansoor for the Taliban’s “un-Islamic nature.”
IS-K destroying opium, cigarettes and marijuana somewhere in Afghanistan
IS-K PROPAGANDA MEDIUMS
ISIS proper’s highly edited videos and general online presence seem be highly effective in spreading its influence in countries with moderate to high levels of internet penetration. In Afghanistan only 5% of the population have access to internet (CIA World Fact Book, 2014). Internet access is essentially nonexistent outside major cities in Afghanistan. ISIS and IS-K propaganda videos likely spread to rural areas of Afghanistan through copies being carried on DVDs, flash drives, SD cards and cell phones. Spreading propaganda in this fashion takes time and is a risky and slow process.
IS-K member showing an ISIS video from Iraq on his cellphone to children in Kunar Province, Afghanistan (Quraishi and Doran, 2015)
Print media is clearly easier for IS-K to distribute in Afghanistan. but print media does not have the same allure of videos. Furthermore, it is unclear how high quality IS-K’s print media is. Substantial parts of their propaganda may be made locally rather than made by ISIS-central’s al-Hayat media center. IS-K’s print propaganda campaign includes distributing pro-ISIS letters and pamphlets (Outlook Afghanistan, 2016). The majority of these releases appear to be in Pashto or Dari and to a lesser extent Urdu. IMU releases pro-ISIS propaganda in Uzbek as well.
An image from an ISIS pamphlet titled “Fatah” that was distributed in Pakistan (Khan, 2014)
Graffiti appears to be another easy method for IS-K to spread propaganda. Similar to “gang tagging” in the US, pro-ISIS graffiti is a cheap method used by IS-K supporters to remind people of an IS-K presence. It’s possible that much of this graffiti is not done by IS-K as an official policy but rather by its supporters and low level fighters. Pro-ISIS graffiti has appeared in Pakistan in multiple locations ranging from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Balochistan (Khan, 2014).
Pro-ISIS graffiti in Peshawar, Pakistan (Jeffery, 2014)
IS-K likely realizes that their reach and spread in Afghanistan is dependent on spreading their propaganda to pull low level fighters away from the Taliban. They launched an FM radio station in Nangarhar Province called “Caliphate Radio” in mid-December broadcasting on 90 FM (Khaama, 2015). This station broadcasted a variety of fatwas, lectures, and a variety of nasheeds (Islamic “A Capella” songs). IS-K released three Pashto nasheeds in 2016, “Remaining, Remaining – Wilayat Khorasan,” “Thankfully, the Islamic State Is Established,” and “Brotherhood of the Caliphate.”
The logo of IS-K’s “The Caliphate Radio”
IS-K’s radio station was finally destroyed by an US airstrike on February 1st, 2016 (CNN, 2016). Prior to its destruction it would appear that their broadcasts reached as far as Jalalabad (CNN, 2016). The radio station provided IS-K a way to reach a much larger audience in Afghanistan than it could previously with just videos and print material.
CONCLUSION:
While IS-K’s propaganda may not be as smooth and polished as the propaganda of ISIS-central, the group has substantially improved its ability to spread propaganda over 2015. The launching of a radio station in Nangarhar, the writing and recording of Pashto nasheeds, and the larger focus on IS-K in ISIS-central’s publications all are signs of an increased propaganda campaign. While IS-K’s radio station has been destroyed, there is little indication what the Afghan government has been doing to counter IS-K propaganda. Though it appears the group’s expansion has slowed in recent weeks due to fighting with both the Taliban and the Afghan government, they are still a major threat to the stability of Nangarhar. A successful counter propaganda campaign will slow down their recruitment abilities and weaken the group as a whole.
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