ISIS in Afghanistan Pt.3: Analyzing Wilayat Khorasan’s Propaganda

INTRODUCTION:

This is the 3rd part of a 3 part series on ISIS in Afghanistan (Part 1 and 2 can be seen here and here respectively). In this write-up we will be analyzing Wilayat Khorasan’s (IS-K) propaganda. ISIS is known for having an extremely well developed media wing that produces an enormous amount of videos, magazines, and newspapers. ISIS has an understanding of media in a way that many other “traditional” jihadist groups never had. ISIS videos often feel like a Hollywood action film with slow motion explosions, combat, sleek graphics and an overall professional design. These videos are a far cry from the “lecture in front of a blank backdrop” style made famous by Osama bin Laden.

ISIS produces content in a variety of languages ranging from  Mandarin Chinese to French. While the majority of ISIS propaganda is produced in Arabic, there has been an increase in Urdu, Pashto and Dari propaganda through late 2015 and early 2016. IS-K’s effectiveness at propaganda will partially dictate whether they can peel away fighters from the Afghan Taliban. Thus we will be analyzing the various types of propaganda used by IS-K, as well as discuss some of the strategy and rhetoric IS-K uses in its propaganda. To do this we must first define what IS-K considers to be its territory of “Khorasan.”


WHAT AREAS CONSTITUTE “KHORASAN”?

Khorasan is a historical region referring to one of the provinces of the Ummayad Caliphate. The term has its roots in Middle Persian; Khorasan means “land where the sun rises.” The term historically included parts of Iran, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan (Britannica, 2015).

khorasan
One possible interpretation of the Khorasan region

Khorasan has a lot of significance among Salafi Jihadist groups. A variety of hadiths (collections of sayings about the prophet Muhammad) mention Khorasan. One hadith narrated on authority of Ibn Majah, Al-Hakim, Ahma states that “If you see the Black Banners coming from Khorasan go to them immediately, even if you must crawl over ice, because indeed amongst them is the Caliph, Al-Mahdi.” While the accuracy of this hadith is debated among Islamic scholars, many Salafi groups follow this viewpoint (Taylor, 2014). Al-Qaeda’s online magazine was called “Vanguards of Khorasan” and references to Khorasan are often sprinkled through a variety of Islamist literature (Taylor, 2014).

IS-K’s definition of what they consider to be part of Khorasan is unclear. In January, 2016 an interview in ISIS’s English magazine “Dabiq” with Hafiz Saeed Khan (the head of IS-K) shed some light on their claims. Khan confirmed that they considered Kashmir as part of their proclaimed Khorasan. Furthermore, Khan stated that China is occupying parts of Khorasan. He specifically mentions Turkistan (Xingjiang).

KhanInterviewDabiq
The front cover of the interview with Hafiz Saeed Khan from the 13th issue of ISIS’s English print magazine “Dabiq”

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan are likely included in the definition as well. The inclusion of parts of these territories in the historical Khorasan province of the Ummayad Caliphate supports this argument. Furthermore, IMU propaganda videos released after they joined ISIS still seem to mention Uzbekistan. While a small underground IS-K presence in Punjab and Sindh may exist (largely due to Jundallah joining IS-K), Khan specifies that “Western Pakistan” is included in Khorasan. Thus we can exclude Punjab and Sindh from the definition of Khorasan. Using this information we can map a possible interpretation as to what Khorasan’s claimed territory is.

KhorasanComplete
A rough approximation of territories ISIS considers to be part of Khorasan

IS-K’s claimed territory of Khorasan is massive; it spans multiple countries and 10+ major languages. While Dari/Persian and Pashto are the two biggest languages in the region, Urdu is also a key lingua franca in Pakistan and Indian Kashmir. Consequently, IS-K propaganda tends to be primarily in Pashto, secondarily in Dari and thirdly in Urdu.


BRUTALITY IN PROPAGANDA AS A RECRUITMENT TACTIC

ISIS in general is known for using brutality as a factor in their propaganda. From the burning of a captured Jordanian pilot to throwing people off buildings, ISIS has a history of excessive brutality (CBSNews, 2015). It is possible this was partially an attempt to gain media exposure as well as to “1-up” other Jihadist groups. The killing of a Jordanian pilot in particular created a massive media storm. While the vast majority of reaction to this gruesome incident was negative, it still gave ISIS a larger audience and thus a larger base to recruit from. IS-K seems to be following a similar approach executing several Taliban and village elders with an IED. Such a method of execution is not common in Afghanistan and was reported on by many Afghan newspapers.

Screen Shot 2015-12-17 at 10.16.47 PM
IS-K fighters preparing to execute the captured Taliban and village elders with an IED

IS-K’s brutality may be an attempt to lure younger, hot headed jihadists within the Taliban. The Afghan Taliban has been largely unsuccessful in its mission in overthrowing the Afghan government (though they have been increasingly successful at challenging the Government in recent times). Furthermore, after the death of Mullah Omar was revealed the Afghan Taliban has fractured significantly. IS-K’s brutality may attract hot headed jihadists that are disillusioned with the amount of infighting within the Taliban.

It is important to note that many times brutality may have the opposite effect. Excess brutality may alienate possible recruits or trigger a backlash from the public. IS-K has already experienced this when they executed Hazara civilians in Zabul Province during November, 2015 (Mashal and Shah, 2015). That execution sparked protests in Kabul and led to reprisals by the Taliban that crushed much of the IS-K presence in Zabul (SITE Intelligence Group, 2015). IS-K no longer has any major presence in Zabul due to this.

Afghan men protest to condemn the killing of seven Hazara ethnic minority that were kidnapped and killed by Islamic State militants in Ghazni province
Afghans protest the killing of Hazara civilians by IS-K (REUTERS, 2015)

IS-K’s brutality also triggered backlash in the form of defections. Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, an ex-Guantanamo Bay detainee, pledged allegiance to the group and became a recruiter for IS-K (Joscelyn, 2015). He later revoked his pledge to the group stating that, “He [Hafiz Saeed Khan] unleashed cruelty, took the people to ignorance, violating Islamic injunctions and humiliated Afghans” (Khaama Press, 2015). It is unclear what net effect IS-K’s brutality has had on defections to the group.


IS-K’S RHETORIC AGAINST THE TALIBAN

IS-K’s rhetoric towards the Taliban generally revolves around pointing out their “un-islamic” practices. IS-K has accused the Afghan Taliban and the TTP as being agents of Pakistan on numerous occasions. In the Dabiq interview with Hafiz Saeed Khan the Taliban is described as being “Nationalist,” and that they “rule by tribal customs and judge affairs in accordance with the desires and tradition of the people, traditions opposing the Islamic Shari’ah.” This accusation is based on the fact that the Taliban relies heavily on Pashtunwali (the tribal code of Pashtuns) in its court systems. Accusations of nationalism are likely linked to the fact that the Afghan Taliban does not seek to expand beyond Afghanistan and is largely seen as being a group supported only by Pashtuns. IS-K also highlights the links between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Intelligence as another proof of the Taliban’s “unislamic” nature.

IS-K commander condemin Taliban
An IS-K commander in Kunar Province stating that “The Taliban take their orders from Pakistani Intelligence” in Frontline’s documentary about ISIS in Afghanistan (Quraishi and Doran, 2015)

IS-K also accuses the Taliban of dealing in opium stating that, “the Taliban themselves transport opium and heroin in their personal vehicles, charging a fee to the sellers and the addicts.” IS-K also states that, unlike the Taliban, they not only prohibit opium but cigarettes as well. Videos of IS-K burning cigarettes and opium have surfaced from Afghanistan. However, Afghan government sources state that IS-K wants access to the opium trade (Khaama, 2015). The majority of sources do seem to suggest that IS-K is destroying opium fields. Another interesting point is that despite having broken off from the Taliban, Khan seems to still have respect for the now deceased Mullah Omar. This is possibly done to avoid alienating Taliban who are on the fence about joining IS-K. Khan largely blames Akhtar Mansoor for the Taliban’s “un-Islamic nature.”

IS-K destroying opium
IS-K destroying opium, cigarettes and marijuana somewhere in Afghanistan

 

IS-K PROPAGANDA MEDIUMS

ISIS proper’s highly edited videos and general online presence seem be highly effective in spreading its influence in countries with moderate to high levels of internet penetration. In Afghanistan only 5% of the population have access to internet (CIA World Fact Book, 2014). Internet access is essentially nonexistent outside major cities in Afghanistan. ISIS and IS-K propaganda videos likely spread to rural areas of Afghanistan through copies being carried on DVDs, flash drives, SD cards and cell phones. Spreading propaganda in this fashion takes time and is a risky and slow process.

KunarProvinceCellPhone
IS-K member showing an ISIS video from Iraq on his cellphone to children in Kunar Province, Afghanistan (Quraishi and Doran, 2015)

Print media is clearly easier for IS-K to distribute in Afghanistan. but print media does not have the same allure of videos. Furthermore, it is unclear how high quality IS-K’s print media is. Substantial parts of their propaganda may be made locally rather than made by ISIS-central’s al-Hayat media center. IS-K’s print propaganda campaign includes distributing pro-ISIS letters and pamphlets (Outlook Afghanistan, 2016). The majority of these releases appear to be in Pashto or Dari and to a lesser extent Urdu. IMU releases pro-ISIS propaganda in Uzbek as well.

FatahISIS
An image from an ISIS pamphlet titled “Fatah” that was distributed in Pakistan (Khan, 2014)

Graffiti appears to be another easy method for IS-K to spread propaganda. Similar to “gang tagging” in the US, pro-ISIS graffiti is a cheap method used by IS-K supporters to remind people of an IS-K presence. It’s possible that much of this graffiti is not done by IS-K as an official policy but rather by  its supporters and low level fighters. Pro-ISIS graffiti has appeared in Pakistan in multiple locations ranging from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Balochistan (Khan, 2014).

Pro ISIS graffiti
Pro-ISIS graffiti in Peshawar, Pakistan (Jeffery, 2014)

IS-K likely realizes that their reach and spread in Afghanistan is dependent on spreading their propaganda to pull low level fighters away from the Taliban. They launched an FM radio station in Nangarhar Province called “Caliphate Radio” in mid-December broadcasting on 90 FM (Khaama, 2015). This station broadcasted a variety of fatwas, lectures, and a variety of nasheeds (Islamic “A Capella” songs). IS-K released three Pashto nasheeds in 2016, “Remaining, Remaining – Wilayat Khorasan,” “Thankfully, the Islamic State Is Established,” and “Brotherhood of the Caliphate.”

IS-K radio
The logo of IS-K’s “The Caliphate Radio”

IS-K’s radio station was finally destroyed by an US airstrike  on February 1st, 2016 (CNN, 2016). Prior to its destruction it would appear that their broadcasts reached as far as Jalalabad (CNN, 2016). The radio station provided IS-K a way to reach a much larger audience in Afghanistan than it could previously with just videos and print material.


CONCLUSION:

While IS-K’s propaganda may not be as smooth and polished as the propaganda of ISIS-central, the group has substantially improved its ability to spread propaganda over 2015. The launching of a radio station in Nangarhar,  the writing and recording of Pashto nasheeds, and the larger focus on IS-K in ISIS-central’s publications all are signs of an increased propaganda campaign. While IS-K’s radio station has been destroyed, there is little indication what the Afghan government has been doing to counter IS-K propaganda. Though it appears the group’s expansion has slowed in recent weeks due to fighting with both the Taliban and the Afghan government, they are still a major threat to the stability of Nangarhar. A successful counter propaganda campaign will slow down their recruitment abilities and weaken the group as a whole.

Citations for this post are available here. Feel free to follow our blog and stay tuned for other write-ups and informative content. Part 1 and 2 of this series can be seen here and here respectively.

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