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Al-Moutasem Brigade: An American Backed FSA Group in Northern Aleppo

On By theOSINTblogIn Middle East, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq2 Comments

INTRODUCTION:

American support for rebel groups in Syria is not a new story. The U.S. has backed a variety of rebel groups in Syria in their fight against the Syrian government and ISIS. After the much publicized collapse of the U.S. trained Division 30 at the hands of al-Nusra Front, there have been few public statements from government agencies specifying which groups are currently being armed or trained. In recent months the rebels around Azaz in Northern Aleppo Governorate seem to be increasingly supported by Turkey and the US.

Northern Aleppo Governorate Map
A map of rebel held territory in Northern Aleppo near Azaz on March 14th, 2016 (@ValkryV, 2016)

The rebel groups in this North Aleppo pocket are cut off from Syrian Government territory, and while they have clashed with the Kurdish YPG and other members of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The U.S. seems to have intervened and tried to broker a truce between rebels and the YPG in this area, though it remains to be seen if this will have any effect. In either case, the rebel groups that operate in Northern Aleppo Governorate will be a key factor in securing the Turkish border and removing ISIS from the area.

In this write-up we will be examining al-Moutasem Brigade (Arabic: لواء المعتصم); they are an FSA group that operates in Northern Aleppo Governorate around Azaz. The group is relatively new to the war in Syria; al-Moutasem’s videos first appeared on the internet in November, 2015. In recent months they have drastically increased in activity and size with multiple pickup trucks and heavy machine guns. Furthermore, video and photographic evidence we have gathered suggests they are backed by the U.S.

moutasem flag
An al-Moutasem fighter with the group’s flag (note his plate carrier is designed to carry STANAG NATO magazines)

SMALL ARMS USAGE:

Al-Moutasem Brigade uses a variety of American weapons and gear. While it is possible that some were purchased on the black market, the sheer number of American weapons that the group uses suggests that they were supplied these weapons. Logistics is a key factor in determining whether these groups are American backed. NATO ammunition is not common in Syria and supplying expensive smuggled NATO ammunition would be expensive and too costly for a group of al-Moutasem’s size.

Al-Moutasem has been spotted using multiple M16A2 rifles and at least one M16A2 with an ACOG scope. While the number of M16A2 rifles the group has is suggestive of foreign backing, it is not conclusive proof since significant numbers of M16A2 rifles are available on the black market. Furthermore, Turkey and a variety of other countries in the Middle East use the M16A2. Thus, the appearance of such a large number of M16A2 rifles with the group may point to foreign backing, but it does not necessarily point to explicit American backing of the group. However, the M16A2s combined with other evidence does suggest American backing.

M16A2
A fighter from the al-Moutasem Brigade prepares to fire his M16A2
M16A2 with ACOG
An M16A2 with an ACOG scope being used by an al-Moutasem Brigade fighter

Moving on to light and medium machine guns, al-Moutasem has several machine guns that point towards U.S. backing. The group has at least two M249 Light Machine Guns (LMG). The M249 LMG fires 5.56x45mm NATO ammunition using an M27 disintegrating link ammunition belt. The logistics involved in supplying ammunition for the M249 are certainly beyond the means of a small group like al-Moutasem. Most likely a foreign backer is supplying them with that ammunition. Furthermore, Al-Moutasem’s M249s have been upgraded with a SAVIT corporation “para-style” adjustable stock. This is the same stock used in the U.S. Paratrooper variant of the M249.

M249 with front grip and parastock
A M249 LMG with a “para-style” adjustable stock and an added forward hand grip being used by al-Moutasem Brigade
dude goes rambo with m249 with para stock
A fighter from al-Moutasem Brigade fires his M249 LMG that has been modified with a “para-style” adjustable stock (note the disintegrating M-27 belt)

Finally, the al-Moutasem Brigade has been spotted firing an M240B (7.62x51mm NATO) Medium Machine Gun (MMG). While the M240B is used by Iraqi Special Operations Forces, it is still an incredibly uncommon weapon in the Middle East as a whole. The presence of this weapon among such a small rebel group clearly points to American support.

M240B
A two man MMG team from al-Moutasem Brigade engages ISIS positions using a M240B

MORTARS AND VEHICLE USAGE:

Al-Moutasem Brigade like many other groups in Syria owns a variety of mortar tubes of various sizes. What is unusual however is the presence of American mortar systems with the group. They have been spotted using the M224 60mm mortar, M252 81mm mortar and M120 120mm mortar on several occasions.

Mortars2
A M252 mortar, M120 mortar and M224 mortar being used by al-Moutasem Brigade (from front to back)

Al-Moutasem usually uses mortar rounds that have “cheese charge” or “ring” style mortar propellant charges. This style of mortar propellant is common in American mortar round designs. This style of mortar round is not very common in Syria where the “bag style” mortar propellant charges are more commonly seen.

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A fighter from al-Moutasem loading a mortar round that has “ring” style propellant charges

Al-Moutasem has several “technicals” some of which are mounted with American .50cal M2HB heavy machine guns. “Technicals” refer to pickup trucks mounted with machine guns or other heavy weaponry. The group has at least 5 pickup trucks mounted with M2HB HMGs and they have a number of other pickup trucks equipped with other heavy machine guns. The presence of the M2HB machine gun points to American backing. Furthermore, these guns are mounted using an American manufactured MK93 mount. This shock absorbing mount is used by the U.S. military to mount .50 cal M2HB machine guns on vehicles as well.

M2 Browning on truck with go-pro
An al-Moutasem “technical” armed with a M2HB machine gun (note the number of modifications and aftermarket additions to the truck)

The spare tire mounted on the rear of the “technical” as seen above is of particular interest. Later on in the video we get a closer look at the tire and learn it is a BF Goodrich brand tire. Furthermore, the tread pattern in the video matches the tread pattern seen on BF Goodrich All Terrain TA/KO2 tires.

Al-Moutasem's spare tire
Al-Moutasem’s spare tire
All Terrain TA/KO2 Tread Pattern
All Terrain TA/KO2 Tread Pattern

This tread pattern is not available in Syria or any of the Middle East and is a fairly new tread pattern (released in late 2014). We were unable to find evidence of this tire tread pattern being sold anywhere other than the US, Mexico, Canada, the UK and Ireland. The presence of this tread pattern in Syria along with brand new 2014 Toyota Hiluxes, American M2HB Browning machine guns and complex recoil compensating gun carriers certainly points towards American involvement.

CONCLUSION:

While the presence of these American weapons and other equipment may not prove American support for al-Moutasem individually, together they paint a clear picture that al-Moutasem Brigade is backed and armed by the United States. In addition to this, there is unconfirmed video evidence that the U.S. supports al-Moutasem in their fight against ISIS through providing close air support. We were unable to verify the authenticity of the footage, but with the level of U.S. support that al-Moutasem has received it would not be surprising if this was the case.

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Fighters point towards an A-10 Warthog that may have been providing close air support to rebels including al-Moutasem Brigade

In either case, it is clear that the U.S. government remains committed to training Syrian rebel groups for the fight against ISIS. The al-Moutasem Brigade is just one of many US backed groups that have begun to appear in Northern Aleppo Governorate and elsewhere in Syria. The collapse of the U.S. backed Division 30 at the hands of al-Nusra Front has not stopped American efforts to arm Syrian rebel groups in their fight against ISIS. The al-Moutasem Brigade will clearly be a key player in the defeat of ISIS in Northern Aleppo Governorate.

(This write-up was created with assistance from Twitter users @PurpleCombatMod and @The_Groundview, feel free to follow them on Twitter for updates on the situation in the Middle East and Syria)

 

 

 

 

ISIS in Afghanistan Pt.3: Analyzing Wilayat Khorasan’s Propaganda

On By theOSINTblogIn Afghanistan, Central Asia, Former Soviet Republics, India, Pakistan, South AsiaLeave a comment

INTRODUCTION:

This is the 3rd part of a 3 part series on ISIS in Afghanistan (Part 1 and 2 can be seen here and here respectively). In this write-up we will be analyzing Wilayat Khorasan’s (IS-K) propaganda. ISIS is known for having an extremely well developed media wing that produces an enormous amount of videos, magazines, and newspapers. ISIS has an understanding of media in a way that many other “traditional” jihadist groups never had. ISIS videos often feel like a Hollywood action film with slow motion explosions, combat, sleek graphics and an overall professional design. These videos are a far cry from the “lecture in front of a blank backdrop” style made famous by Osama bin Laden.

ISIS produces content in a variety of languages ranging from  Mandarin Chinese to French. While the majority of ISIS propaganda is produced in Arabic, there has been an increase in Urdu, Pashto and Dari propaganda through late 2015 and early 2016. IS-K’s effectiveness at propaganda will partially dictate whether they can peel away fighters from the Afghan Taliban. Thus we will be analyzing the various types of propaganda used by IS-K, as well as discuss some of the strategy and rhetoric IS-K uses in its propaganda. To do this we must first define what IS-K considers to be its territory of “Khorasan.”

WHAT AREAS CONSTITUTE “KHORASAN”?

Khorasan is a historical region referring to one of the provinces of the Ummayad Caliphate. The term has its roots in Middle Persian; Khorasan means “land where the sun rises.” The term historically included parts of Iran, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan (Britannica, 2015).

khorasan
One possible interpretation of the Khorasan region

Khorasan has a lot of significance among Salafi Jihadist groups. A variety of hadiths (collections of sayings about the prophet Muhammad) mention Khorasan. One hadith narrated on authority of Ibn Majah, Al-Hakim, Ahma states that “If you see the Black Banners coming from Khorasan go to them immediately, even if you must crawl over ice, because indeed amongst them is the Caliph, Al-Mahdi.” While the accuracy of this hadith is debated among Islamic scholars, many Salafi groups follow this viewpoint (Taylor, 2014). Al-Qaeda’s online magazine was called “Vanguards of Khorasan” and references to Khorasan are often sprinkled through a variety of Islamist literature (Taylor, 2014).

IS-K’s definition of what they consider to be part of Khorasan is unclear. In January, 2016 an interview in ISIS’s English magazine “Dabiq” with Hafiz Saeed Khan (the head of IS-K) shed some light on their claims. Khan confirmed that they considered Kashmir as part of their proclaimed Khorasan. Furthermore, Khan stated that China is occupying parts of Khorasan. He specifically mentions Turkistan (Xingjiang).

KhanInterviewDabiq
The front cover of the interview with Hafiz Saeed Khan from the 13th issue of ISIS’s English print magazine “Dabiq”

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan are likely included in the definition as well. The inclusion of parts of these territories in the historical Khorasan province of the Ummayad Caliphate supports this argument. Furthermore, IMU propaganda videos released after they joined ISIS still seem to mention Uzbekistan. While a small underground IS-K presence in Punjab and Sindh may exist (largely due to Jundallah joining IS-K), Khan specifies that “Western Pakistan” is included in Khorasan. Thus we can exclude Punjab and Sindh from the definition of Khorasan. Using this information we can map a possible interpretation as to what Khorasan’s claimed territory is.

KhorasanComplete
A rough approximation of territories ISIS considers to be part of Khorasan

IS-K’s claimed territory of Khorasan is massive; it spans multiple countries and 10+ major languages. While Dari/Persian and Pashto are the two biggest languages in the region, Urdu is also a key lingua franca in Pakistan and Indian Kashmir. Consequently, IS-K propaganda tends to be primarily in Pashto, secondarily in Dari and thirdly in Urdu.

BRUTALITY IN PROPAGANDA AS A RECRUITMENT TACTIC

ISIS in general is known for using brutality as a factor in their propaganda. From the burning of a captured Jordanian pilot to throwing people off buildings, ISIS has a history of excessive brutality (CBSNews, 2015). It is possible this was partially an attempt to gain media exposure as well as to “1-up” other Jihadist groups. The killing of a Jordanian pilot in particular created a massive media storm. While the vast majority of reaction to this gruesome incident was negative, it still gave ISIS a larger audience and thus a larger base to recruit from. IS-K seems to be following a similar approach executing several Taliban and village elders with an IED. Such a method of execution is not common in Afghanistan and was reported on by many Afghan newspapers.

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IS-K fighters preparing to execute the captured Taliban and village elders with an IED

IS-K’s brutality may be an attempt to lure younger, hot headed jihadists within the Taliban. The Afghan Taliban has been largely unsuccessful in its mission in overthrowing the Afghan government (though they have been increasingly successful at challenging the Government in recent times). Furthermore, after the death of Mullah Omar was revealed the Afghan Taliban has fractured significantly. IS-K’s brutality may attract hot headed jihadists that are disillusioned with the amount of infighting within the Taliban.

It is important to note that many times brutality may have the opposite effect. Excess brutality may alienate possible recruits or trigger a backlash from the public. IS-K has already experienced this when they executed Hazara civilians in Zabul Province during November, 2015 (Mashal and Shah, 2015). That execution sparked protests in Kabul and led to reprisals by the Taliban that crushed much of the IS-K presence in Zabul (SITE Intelligence Group, 2015). IS-K no longer has any major presence in Zabul due to this.

Afghan men protest to condemn the killing of seven Hazara ethnic minority that were kidnapped and killed by Islamic State militants in Ghazni province
Afghans protest the killing of Hazara civilians by IS-K (REUTERS, 2015)

IS-K’s brutality also triggered backlash in the form of defections. Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, an ex-Guantanamo Bay detainee, pledged allegiance to the group and became a recruiter for IS-K (Joscelyn, 2015). He later revoked his pledge to the group stating that, “He [Hafiz Saeed Khan] unleashed cruelty, took the people to ignorance, violating Islamic injunctions and humiliated Afghans” (Khaama Press, 2015). It is unclear what net effect IS-K’s brutality has had on defections to the group.

IS-K’S RHETORIC AGAINST THE TALIBAN

IS-K’s rhetoric towards the Taliban generally revolves around pointing out their “un-islamic” practices. IS-K has accused the Afghan Taliban and the TTP as being agents of Pakistan on numerous occasions. In the Dabiq interview with Hafiz Saeed Khan the Taliban is described as being “Nationalist,” and that they “rule by tribal customs and judge affairs in accordance with the desires and tradition of the people, traditions opposing the Islamic Shari’ah.” This accusation is based on the fact that the Taliban relies heavily on Pashtunwali (the tribal code of Pashtuns) in its court systems. Accusations of nationalism are likely linked to the fact that the Afghan Taliban does not seek to expand beyond Afghanistan and is largely seen as being a group supported only by Pashtuns. IS-K also highlights the links between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Intelligence as another proof of the Taliban’s “unislamic” nature.

IS-K commander condemin Taliban
An IS-K commander in Kunar Province stating that “The Taliban take their orders from Pakistani Intelligence” in Frontline’s documentary about ISIS in Afghanistan (Quraishi and Doran, 2015)

IS-K also accuses the Taliban of dealing in opium stating that, “the Taliban themselves transport opium and heroin in their personal vehicles, charging a fee to the sellers and the addicts.” IS-K also states that, unlike the Taliban, they not only prohibit opium but cigarettes as well. Videos of IS-K burning cigarettes and opium have surfaced from Afghanistan. However, Afghan government sources state that IS-K wants access to the opium trade (Khaama, 2015). The majority of sources do seem to suggest that IS-K is destroying opium fields. Another interesting point is that despite having broken off from the Taliban, Khan seems to still have respect for the now deceased Mullah Omar. This is possibly done to avoid alienating Taliban who are on the fence about joining IS-K. Khan largely blames Akhtar Mansoor for the Taliban’s “un-Islamic nature.”

IS-K destroying opium
IS-K destroying opium, cigarettes and marijuana somewhere in Afghanistan

 

IS-K PROPAGANDA MEDIUMS

ISIS proper’s highly edited videos and general online presence seem be highly effective in spreading its influence in countries with moderate to high levels of internet penetration. In Afghanistan only 5% of the population have access to internet (CIA World Fact Book, 2014). Internet access is essentially nonexistent outside major cities in Afghanistan. ISIS and IS-K propaganda videos likely spread to rural areas of Afghanistan through copies being carried on DVDs, flash drives, SD cards and cell phones. Spreading propaganda in this fashion takes time and is a risky and slow process.

KunarProvinceCellPhone
IS-K member showing an ISIS video from Iraq on his cellphone to children in Kunar Province, Afghanistan (Quraishi and Doran, 2015)

Print media is clearly easier for IS-K to distribute in Afghanistan. but print media does not have the same allure of videos. Furthermore, it is unclear how high quality IS-K’s print media is. Substantial parts of their propaganda may be made locally rather than made by ISIS-central’s al-Hayat media center. IS-K’s print propaganda campaign includes distributing pro-ISIS letters and pamphlets (Outlook Afghanistan, 2016). The majority of these releases appear to be in Pashto or Dari and to a lesser extent Urdu. IMU releases pro-ISIS propaganda in Uzbek as well.

FatahISIS
An image from an ISIS pamphlet titled “Fatah” that was distributed in Pakistan (Khan, 2014)

Graffiti appears to be another easy method for IS-K to spread propaganda. Similar to “gang tagging” in the US, pro-ISIS graffiti is a cheap method used by IS-K supporters to remind people of an IS-K presence. It’s possible that much of this graffiti is not done by IS-K as an official policy but rather by  its supporters and low level fighters. Pro-ISIS graffiti has appeared in Pakistan in multiple locations ranging from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Balochistan (Khan, 2014).

Pro ISIS graffiti
Pro-ISIS graffiti in Peshawar, Pakistan (Jeffery, 2014)

IS-K likely realizes that their reach and spread in Afghanistan is dependent on spreading their propaganda to pull low level fighters away from the Taliban. They launched an FM radio station in Nangarhar Province called “Caliphate Radio” in mid-December broadcasting on 90 FM (Khaama, 2015). This station broadcasted a variety of fatwas, lectures, and a variety of nasheeds (Islamic “A Capella” songs). IS-K released three Pashto nasheeds in 2016, “Remaining, Remaining – Wilayat Khorasan,” “Thankfully, the Islamic State Is Established,” and “Brotherhood of the Caliphate.”

IS-K radio
The logo of IS-K’s “The Caliphate Radio”

IS-K’s radio station was finally destroyed by an US airstrike  on February 1st, 2016 (CNN, 2016). Prior to its destruction it would appear that their broadcasts reached as far as Jalalabad (CNN, 2016). The radio station provided IS-K a way to reach a much larger audience in Afghanistan than it could previously with just videos and print material.

CONCLUSION:

While IS-K’s propaganda may not be as smooth and polished as the propaganda of ISIS-central, the group has substantially improved its ability to spread propaganda over 2015. The launching of a radio station in Nangarhar,  the writing and recording of Pashto nasheeds, and the larger focus on IS-K in ISIS-central’s publications all are signs of an increased propaganda campaign. While IS-K’s radio station has been destroyed, there is little indication what the Afghan government has been doing to counter IS-K propaganda. Though it appears the group’s expansion has slowed in recent weeks due to fighting with both the Taliban and the Afghan government, they are still a major threat to the stability of Nangarhar. A successful counter propaganda campaign will slow down their recruitment abilities and weaken the group as a whole.

Citations for this post are available here. Feel free to follow our blog and stay tuned for other write-ups and informative content. Part 1 and 2 of this series can be seen here and here respectively.

ISIS in Afghanistan Pt. 2: Wilayat Khorasan’s Leadership Structure

On By theOSINTblogIn Afghanistan, Central Asia, Former Soviet Republics, Pakistan, South AsiaLeave a comment

INTRODUCTION: 

Following our last write-up on ISIS affiliate Wilayat Khorasan (IS-K), the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated significantly. The US government added Wilayat Khorasan to its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Furthermore, Wilayat Khorasan has conducted attacks with increasing frequency and on a larger scale. On January 13th, 2016 IS-K attacked the Pakistani consulate in Jalalabad, Afghanistan in a complex multi-person suicide bombing. This is the first large scale IS-K attack in a major city in Afghanistan (the prior 2015 bombing of a bank in Jalalabad has not been 100% linked to IS-K).

Despite the heavy losses ISIS has been facing in Syria and Iraq (with the Iraqi Government recapturing nearly all of Ramadi from ISIS in December and January), ISIS growth has not ceased in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Estimates by the UK based Royal United Services Institute put IS-K numbers at 7,000-8,500 in Afghanistan and 2,000-3,000 in Pakistan. In this write-up we will be analyzing and mapping IS-K’s leadership structure.

WHERE IS WILAYAT KHORASAN’S LEADERSHIP COMING FROM?

The vast majority of IS-K leaders and fighters are former Afghan Taliban or former Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). A small number of fighters were previously linked to Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The fractured nature of both the Afghan Taliban and the TTP makes it fairly easy for IS-K to recruit commanders and fighters. In our previous write-up we discussed IS-K’s presence in Nangarhar and their general background and strategy in Afghanistan. While IS-K’s stronghold is still in Nangarhar and Kunar, IS-K is operating in a variety of provinces including Zabul and Ghazni.

It is not particularly challenging for IS-K to gain a presence in districts that are far flung from their core areas in Eastern Afghanistan. All it takes for an IS-K presence in a district is simply one or two Taliban commanders switching allegiance. As we will see in our analysis of the leadership structure none of IS-K’s leaders come from Syria or Iraq. Indeed, very few of IS-K’s leaders are even Afghan; the vast majority of its leadership is Pakistani.

WILAYAT KHORASAN’S LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE

KPK
IS-K Leadership Structure in KPK Province and FATA in Pakistan

 

Diagramre4
IS-K Leadership Structure in Afghanistan and Pakistan (excluding KPK Province and FATA)

HAFIZ SAEED KHAN

Hafiz Saeed Khan

Alias: Mullah Saeed Orakzai

Age: 42

Position: Emir and Wali (governor) of Wilayat Khorasan

Place of Birth: Mamozai Town, Orakzai Agency, FATA, Pakistan

Former Allegiances: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Afghan Taliban

Status: Alive

About:

Not much is known about Hafiz Saeed Khan’s early life; however, he may have attended Dar-ul-Ulum Islamia (a madrasa in Hangu Town, Pakistan). After the US invasion of Afghanistan, Khan traveled into Afghanistan and joined the Afghan Taliban. He was reportedly in Kabul for 2 years during this time. At some point he became friends with Batiullah Mehsud (a Pakistani that was advising the Afghan Taliban in religious matters). In 2007, Batiullah Mehsud formed the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and made Khan an Emir and religious leader for Orakzai Agency, Pakistan. By 2009 Khan was the head of the TTP in Orakzai Agency as well as a local judge. Following Mehsud’s death and the fragmentation of the TTP, it would appear that Khan grew disillusioned with the TTP. He and several other ex-TTP commanders pledged allegiance to ISIS in October, 2014. Reports that he was killed in an American drone strike emerged in July, 2015. This has been denied by ISIS and interviews with him in Dabiq (ISIS’s English print magazine) suggest that he is alive.

SHEIKH KULZAMAN AL-FATEH

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Alias: Gul Zaman

Position: 2nd in command to Hafiz Saeed Khan and Emir of Khyber Region

Former Allegiances: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

Status: Dead (Killed in US drone strike in July, 2015)

About:

Sheikh Kulzaman al-Fateh was a former TTP chief of Khyber Agency, Pakistan. He pledged allegiance to ISIS along with Hafiz Saeed Khan in October, 2014. He was reportedly 2nd in command to Hafiz Saeed Khan. Kulzaman was killed in a US drone strike in July along with Shahidullah Shahid (an ex-TTP spokesperson also part of IS-K). IS-K has not publicly announced a successor to Kulzaman.

KHALED MANSOUR

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Position: Emir in Hangu District, Pakistan

Former Allegiances: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

Status: Alive

About:

Khaled Mansour (also known as Khalid Mansoor) is a former TTP chief of Hangu District, Pakistan. He pledged allegiance to ISIS along with Hafiz Saeed Khan in October, 2014.

MUFTI HASSAN SWATI

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Position: Emir in Peshawar, Pakistan

Former Allegiances: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

Status: Alive

About:

Mufti Hassan Swati is a former head of the TTP in Peshawar. He was responsible for a suicide bombing that targeted a hotel in a Shia neighborhood in Peshawar in Feburary, 2014. Nine people were killed in that blast and 50 were injured. He pledged allegiance to ISIS along with Hafiz Saeed Khan in October, 2014.

TALHAH

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Position: Emir in Lakki Marwat District, Pakistan

Former Allegiances: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

Status: Alive

About: 

Talhah (likely an alias) is an Emir in Lakki Marwat District, Pakistan. He is most likely low level ex-TTP. It is possible he was a spokesperson for a TTP splinter group known as “TTP Tariq Group” at some point. He pledged allegiance to ISIS in January, 2015.

 HAFIZ DOLAT KHAN

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Alias: Hafiz Ahmed

Position: Emir in Kurram Agency

Former Allegiances: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

Status: Alive

About:

Dolat is a former TTP chief of Kurram agency (he was appointed to that role in May 2013). He was also responsible for a bomb blast targeting a JUI-F (A Pakistani Islamist political party) rally in Kurram agency during May of 2013. That blast led to the deaths of around 23 people. Dolat pledged allegiance to ISIS in January, 2015.

OBAIDULLAH PESHAWARI

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Position: Emir of Tawad al-Jihad in Peshawar

Former Allegiances: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

Status: Alive

About:

Peshawari is the emir of Tawad al-Jihad. Tawad al-Jihad is a small TTP splinter group that mostly operated around Peshawar, Pakistan. Peshawari was likely in the TTP as well prior to its collapse. He pledged allegiance to ISIS in January, 2015.

SHEIKH ABU YAZID ABDUL QAHIR KHORASANI

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Position: Unknown

Status: Alive

About:

Khorasani is the founder of Abtalul Islamic Foundation. Abtalul is an online forum and media group that supports jihadists and radical Islamism. His role in IS-K is unknown; however, Khorasani has significant experience with media, video editing, audio editing and filming. It is possible that Khorasani is managing IS-K’s propaganda. Abtalul’s website is currently down; it is uncertain if it was shutdown by him or by government authorities. His deputy “Jawaad” pledged allegiance to ISIS in his stead on January, 2015.

SHEIKH MUHSKIN

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Position: Emir of Kunar Province

Former Allegiances: Afghan Taliban

Status: Alive

About: 

One of the few Afghans in IS-K’s Leadership Sheikh Muhskin is the emir of Kunar Province. He pledged allegiance to ISIS in January, 2015.

UMAR AL-MANSOOR

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Position: Unknown

Former Affiliation: Lal Masjid

Status: Alive

About: 

Mansoor is from Lal Masjid a radical Islamist mosque and madrasa complex in Islamabad, Pakistan. The mosque has had a significant ties with jihadists dating all the way back to the 1980’s. Lal Masjid is infamous for being raided by the Pakistani government due to its anti-government activity. The mosque recently was embroiled in controversy again when elements within it voiced support of ISIS. While it is unclear what Mansoor’s role will be, it’s likely he will be involved in dealing with religious matters given his schooling at Lal Masjid.

ABDUL RAHIM MUSLIM DOST

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Age: 56

Position: None (former recruiter)

Former Allegiance: Allegedly Jamat al-Dawa al-Quran, IS-K

Status: Alive

About: 

Dost is notable for being a former Guantanamo Bay Detainee. He was captured on November, 2001 and released in 2005 with no charges held against him. He resurfaced in 2014 and pledged allegiance to ISIS. He was reportedly serving as a recruiter for ISIS in Afghanistan, but he denied being a commander in IS-K. He withdrew his allegiance to Hafiz Saeed Khan in October, 2015.

UTHMAN GHAZI

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Alias: Usman Ghazi

Position: Emir of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

Status: Unknown/Possibly Dead

About: 

The nominal leader of IMU (IMU in reality is heavily splintered), Uthman Ghazi pledged allegiance to ISIS officially in July, 2015. Clashes between his group and local Taliban erupted soon after this. It is unclear to what extent IMU as a whole has followed him and joined IS-K. In some districts IMU are Taliban allies while in others they are IS-K allies. Fierce clashes between the Taliban and the IMU in Zabul Province may have lead to his death in January, 2016.

AHMED MARWAT

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Position: Spokesperson and Likely Leader of Jundallah

Former Allegiance: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

Status: Alive

About: 

Ahmed Marwat is the spokesperson and likely leader of the Pakistani Islamist group Jundallah. Jundallah pledged allegiance to ISIS in November, 2014. The group is responsible for a variety of attacks including the 2015 Karachi Bus shooting and the 2012 Kohistan Massacre. Jundallah is sectarian; many of their attacks target Shias and Christians. They conduct operations primarily in the core provinces of Pakistan including Punjab and Sindh. The group pledged allegiance to ISIS in November, 2014.

MANGAL BAGH AFRIDI

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Alias: Haji Mangal Bagh

Position: Leader of Lashkar-e-Islam

Status: Alive

About: 

Bagh is the leader of Lashkar-e-Islam (a small militant outfit originally based in Khyber Agency, Pakistan). He reportedly pledged allegiance to ISIS in January, 2016. A Lashkar-e-Islam and IS-K meeting in Achin district was hit by an airstrike in December, 2015. Lashkar-e-Islam reportedly has bases in Nazyan district of Nangarhar Province.

CONCLUSION:

This breakdown of the IS-K leadership structure reveals several key facts about Wilayat Khorasan. Firsly, the leadership structure is heavily Pakistani and heavily ex-TTP. Secondly, very few Afghans are present in the upper levels of the organization. The lack of Afghans in the leadership structure may hinder IS-K recruitment in Afghanistan. The leadership structure is largely Pashtun as well. IS-K likely will face challenges expanding to non-Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan as a result of this.

The ties between Lal Masjid and IS-K are a major concern and threat. Radical madrasas in Pakistan may serve as a nexus for IS-K recruitment in areas that have traditionally lacked a significant TTP presence. Lal Masjid in particular is known to have funneled jihadists into Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Pakistan also may serve as a hotbed for IS-K recruitment. Following Operation Zarb-e-Azb, an enormous number of Pashtuns fled the violence in the FATA and became IDPs within Pakistan. These IDPs largely moved to slums in Punjab and Sindh. These slums are poor and often have significant TTP and militant links. In Karachi police routinely raid slums to arrest TTP militants. The heavily fragmented TTP in the slums of Karachi may serve as a recruiting ground for IS-K. The Pakistani police are largely responsible for dealing with the militants in the slums of Karachi and Lahore. The police are largely ill-equipped for dealing with this threat due to poor funding, corruption and lack of training. Jundallah (now part of IS-K) largely operates in core Pakistani provinces rather than in the remote tribal areas; thus, IS-K may attempt to increase recruitment in those areas if their expansion in Afghanistan slows.

IS-K is an emerging threat in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their presence further challenges the already unstable Afghan government and risks bringing a fresh wave of violence to Pakistan. Further cooperation between the Afghan  and Pakistani governments is required to successfully combat this threat. Furthermore, NATO’s Operation Resolute Support must ramp up the training of the Afghan National Security Forces, as well as offer assistance in countering ISIS propaganda. In our next write-up we will analyze IS-K’s propaganda, as well as compare and contrast it to the propaganda of the Afghan Taliban. A list of sources for this write-up are available upon request. Our previous write-up on this topic, “ISIS in Afghanistan Pt. 1: ISIS in Nangarhar Province,” can be read here.