THE IMPORTANCE OF AIR DEFENSE:
One of the key advantages a conventional military has in fighting non-state actors is its air force. Airplanes, drones, and helicopters all act as massive force multipliers against ground forces through direct air to ground attacks (whether that is CAS or DAS). Aircraft can also act as a force multiplier through support functions such as logistics, intelligence gathering, troop transport and more. For a non-state actor, disrupting or otherwise degrading a state’s air force is often a key objective. There are many different methods that ground forces can employ to disrupting enemy air assets ranging from simple massed small arms fire to tripod mounted heavy machine guns (e.g. DShK) to anti-aircraft artillery (e.g. ZSU) to guided missile systems. Guided missile systems are particularly effective at degrading enemy air capabilities given their ability to strike air craft that are flying at altitudes above the range of unguided systems. There are a variety of anti-air systems ranging from hand held systems (e.g. Strela) to larger vehicle mounted systems (e.g. Buk). This article will focus primarily on the hand held surface-to-air missile systems (MANPADS) and their role in the Syrian Civil War.
WHAT ARE MANPADS?
MANPADS are a guided shoulder launched ground-to-air missile system that are primarily used to target low-flying aircraft (hence the name MAN-Portable Air-Defense Systems). Generally speaking MANPADS are usually carried by a dedicated anti-air team or are often found mounted on vehicles either as a standalone anti-air system (e.g. mounted on an unarmored truck). They can also be carried by dedicated anti-air vehicles (e.g. HS MO9 BOV-3). MANPADS can also be mounted on IFVs, Tanks, or APCs to give a basic air defense ability to vehicles that are generally at a disadvantage when facing aircraft.
HOW ARE MANPADS GUIDED?
There are 3 main types of guidance systems for MANPADS, Infrared, Command Line-of-Sight, and Laser guided (Kirkham and Okechukwu, 2010).
Infrared (IR): IR systems operate by sensing the heat signature of an aircraft and then locking on to that heat signature. The missiles themselves do not send out any signal making them hard to detect when fired against aircraft. Countermeasure systems such as flares are often carried by aircraft to reduce the likelihood that the missile will hit its target. IR guidance systems are commonly referred to as “fire and forget” systems due to the missile’s internal guidance system entirely controlling the it’s flight path after launch. The vast majority of MANPADS systems in the hands of non-state actors are IR seeking.
Command Line-of-Sight (CLOS): CLOS systems are directly controlled by the gunner who directs the missile to its target using an optical scope or magnified camera. These systems require highly trained and skilled operators and are extremely hard for aircraft to detect and avoid. However, aircraft can attempt to jam the data link between the missile and the operator using electronic warfare systems.
Laser Guided: Laser guided missiles follow a laser that the operator paints and tracks the aircraft with. This is one of the most effective systems given that most aircraft countermeasures will not stop the missile. However these systems are complex, expensive and are only usable by skilled air-defense teams. One downside of the system is that laser guidance can be adversely affected by weather conditions such as rain or smog that may degrade the laser beam strength.
MANPADS VARIANTS:
MANPADS are manufactured by a variety of countries including Russia/Soviet Union, China, the United States, France, the UK and many others (Kirkham and Okechukwu, 2010). This write-up will focus primarily on Russian/Soviet MANPADS as well as the Chinese FN-6. These are the primary systems that are proliferated and used in the Syrian Civil War as well as other conflicts around the world.
SA-7a Grail
Russian Name: 9K32 Strela-2
Designer: KBM Kolomna (USSR)
Production: 1968 – Present
Weight: 33.1 lbs
Length: 1.44 m
Maximum Firing Range: 3400 m
Warhead: 1.15 kg total, 370 g HE content
Detonation Mechanism: Impact and Grazing Fuse/Time Delayed Self-Destruct
Guidance System: Passive IR
Flight Ceiling: 1500 m
Overview:
The SA-7a Grail (Russian: Cтрела-2 “Arrow-2”), was the first system developed by the Soviet Union that fit the MANPADS role. The system suffered from several drawbacks, notably the small warhead failing to successfully destroy a jet as well as failing to hit fast aircraft moving at sharp angles relative to the missile operator (Chankin-Gould and Schroeder, 2004). These along with other issues (i.e. the poor IR Locking system) led to the development of the SA-7b (9K32M Strela-2M) which was introduced into service in 1970. The main differences were an increase to a 2300 m flight ceiling, as well as a range increase to 4200 m and general speed and guidance improvements (Chankin-Gould and Schroeder, 2004). The SA-7b’s warhead size remained the same and still had the issue of not being sufficiently lethal on impact with jets. It is not possible to visually distinguish between the SA-7a and SA-7b, making it extremely hard to determine which system is used in conflicts. The SA-7a Grail is operated by an enormous range of countries and non-state actors including the vast majority of countries in the MENA region.
SA-7a Components
SA-14 Gremlin
Russian Name: 9K34 Strela-3
Designer: KBM Kolomna (USSR)
Production: 1974 – Present
Weight: 35.3 lbs
Length: 1.47 m
Maximum Firing Range: 4100 m
Warhead: 1.17 kg total, 390 g HE content
Detonation Mechanism: Impact and Grazing Fuse/Time Delayed Self-Destruct
Guidance System: Passive IR
Flight Ceiling: 2300 m
Overview:
The SA-14 Gremlin (Russian: Стрела-3 “Arrow-3”) is the successor to SA-7b Grail system and was designed to rectify the issues faced by it. The system is very similar structurally to the SA-7a and SA-7b. The biggest difference would be improvements to the IR seeker head that improved target acquisition and missile accuracy. One key change is the inclusion of a battery cooling unit (BCU), which drastically improved the IR seeking capability through cooling the lead sulphide detector element with pressurized nitrogen gas (Pike, 1999). This allows for a larger range as well as better target acquisition of cooler aircraft. The increase in weight between the SA-7b and SA-14 is largely attributed to the heavier warhead which also lead to a slight decrease in speed. There were also reliability issues in regards to the compressed nitrogen in the battery cooling unit in harsh conditions.
SA-14 Components
SA-16 Gimlet
Russian Name: 9K310 Igla-1
Designer: KBM Mashinostroyeniya
Production: 1981-present
Weight: 37.5 lbs
Length: 1.574 m
Maximum Firing Range: 5,200 m
Detonation Mechanism: Impact and Grazing Fuse (Terminal Maneuver)/Time Delayed Self-Destruct
Guidance System: Passive IR
Flight Ceiling: 3500 m
Overview:
The SA-16 Gimlet (Russian: Игла́-1 “Needle”) is the successor to the SA-14 Gremlin and uses a different structural design. The system represented a significant improvement over the SA-14 in most areas. The Gimlet has an optional Identification Friend or Foe system (IFF) which prevented target acquisition of friendly aircraft (Pike, 1999). It also featured improved leading and elevation systems which simplified the shooting process. An eject motor was added which improved user safety and allowed for indoor usage. A terminal maneuver was also added which allowed the missile to hit the body of the aircraft rather than detonating against the jet nozzle. A secondary charge was added to detonate any remaining missile fuel upon hitting the target further increasing lethality. Improvements to the targeting system mainly consisted of having two separate detectors, one cooled detector that locks on to the target and another uncooled that detects flairs and other decoys (OnWar, 2015). The missile computer uses these dual detectors together to determine the flight path and counteract flares and jamming systems. An aerospike also was added to the nose of the missile which reduces shock wave and thus the amount of heat that contacts the IR lens of the missile (CAT:UXO, 2015). Overall the system was a significant improvement over the SA-14 Gremlin, but was essentially a simplified version of the SA-18.
SA-16 Components
SA-18 Grouse
Russian Name: 9K310 Igla
Designer: KBM Mashinostroyeniya
Production: 1983-present
Weight: 37.5 lbs
Length: 1.574 m
Maximum Firing Range: 5,200 m
Warhead: 1.17 kg total, 390 g HE content
Detonation Mechanism: Impact and Grazing Fuse (Terminal Maneuver)/Time Delayed Self-Destruct
Guidance System: Passive IR
Flight Ceiling: 3500 m
Overview:
The SA-18 Grouse (Russian: Игла́-1 “Needle”) is an improved version of the SA-16 Gimlet. The two systems are extremely similar both in appearance and in function. The key differences are improvements to the IR targeting system as well as the ability to engage aircraft moving at any angle and direction relative to the operator (Chankin-Gould and Schroeder, 2004). The system can also mount a night sight allowing for the engagement of aircraft during night, something that previous MANPADS generations were unable to do. The missile also has a slightly faster peak speed though time to target is ultimately similar.
SA-18 Components
FN-6
Chinese Name: FeiNu-6
Designer: China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation
Weight: 37.5 lbs
Length: 1.495 m
Maximum Firing Range: 5,800 m
Detonation Mechanism: Impact and Grazing Fuse (Terminal Maneuver)/Time Delayed Self-Destruct
Guidance System: Passive IR
Flight Ceiling: 4,000 m
Overview:
The FN-6 (Chinese: 飞弩 “Flying Crossbow”) is a third generation MANPADS developed by China for export. The domestic variant is known as HongYing-6 (Red Tassel-6). The system is heavily modular, allowing the attachment of optical sights, night vision sights, and 2 different types of IFF systems. The FN-6 is extremely effective at defeating air craft countermeasures and is capable of both tail chase and head on attacks (though it performs better at head on attacks). It is in use in a few countries around the world. Sudan (possibly South Sudan by extension) is the only country that operates the system in the MENA region (Reed, 2013).
FN-6 Components
MANPADS TACTICS AND STRATEGY:
MANPADS, despite their fire-and-forget nature, still require proper tactics as well as effective deployment in an overall strategy. Angle of attack is a significant issue in regards to MANPADS; usage at certain angles is not possible in earlier systems and reduces effectiveness in newer systems. For instance, missiles fired at targets that are moving perpendicularly to the MANPADS operator are less likely to hit than missiles fired from an oblique angle. Many systems are unable to target fast moving aircraft flying directly towards the MANPADS operator. The efficacy of engaging an aircraft at various angles varies greatly upon user skill, system variant, aircraft type and speed and so forth. Secondly, MANPADS that do not have an attachable night vision system are not usable during night. MANPADS with night vision systems are rarely seen in Syria, and as such aircraft are freer to operate at night than during the day.
In conventional warfare, MANPADS are only one part of a complex multi-layered air defense grid. In Syria non-state actors rarely have access to advanced long range SAM systems (i.e. Buk or S-200) and thus MANPADS are often the longest range missile system that are used for air-defense. Other than MANPADS, non-state actors use anti-aircraft artillery systems such as ZSUs and ZPUs, as well as heavy machine gun fire to drive off jets and helicopters. Deployment of air defense teams is rarely well-coordinated given the low number of available air-defense assets for non-state actors (general lack of communication and clear command chains also plays a role). As such, MANPADS simply force aircraft to operate at higher altitudes and rely on nap-of-the-earth flight (for helicopters only), thus reducing the efficacy of airstrikes as well as degrading overall logistics and transport ability for aircraft.
Another issue that is fairly unique to Syria is the lack of parts for MANPADS. Non-state actors generally capture MANPADS from Syrian government stocks (which are often in poor condition) or smuggle in MANPADS from other countries. In either case, these systems are often missing key parts or are damaged. For non-state actors, significant problems with the trigger assembly, eject motor, missile or launching tube are generally not fixable; however issues with the batteries are addressable. Improvised battery replacements have been seen in MANPADS though it is unclear how effective they are. In MANPADS that have a BCU rather than a standard battery unit, the lack of cooling gas in any improvised battery will likely reduce the seeking and target acquisition capabilities of the system.
PROLIFERATION OF MANPADS:
MANPADS have generally not been supplied to non-state actors within Syria by the US due to concerns that they could fall into wrong hands and be used to strike at civilian aircraft. However there are allegations that limited transfers of MANPADS from Qatar and Saudi Arabia to various Syrian rebel groups have occurred (Schmitt, 2013). As such, there are two primary methods through which non-state actors in Syria acquire MANPADS: purchasing them on the black market and through directly capturing them from other groups (whether that is other non-state actors or the Syrian Government). Groups can also acquire MANPADS through direct transfers from governments, however this is a fairly rare occurrence. The vast majority of MANPADS are acquired through capturing them (mostly from the Syrian Government). However proliferation is also an important factor given the immense number of MANPADS that are available on the black market due to instability in the MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa.
One of the most famous examples of proliferation and a cautionary tale as to the risks of supplying non-state actors with MANPADS is the US supplying Stinger MANPADS to Afghan mujahedeen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Despite CIA oversight of the program, of the 1000 missile systems supplied several hundred were not accounted for. The CIA was given $10 million in funding to recover the missiles and a missile recovery program was launched in 1990, called Operation MIAS (Missing in Action Stingers). The initial $10 million was not enough, and the CIA requested $55 million from Congress only a few years later (Wright and Broeder, 1993). The program ultimately failed to reach its objective of re-buying the lost Stingers, highlighting the risks that states take when they supply MANPADS to non-state actors (Gupta, 1994).
Pulling MANPADS the systems off the black market is a much harder task than simply destroying the systems all together. As the failures of Operation MIAS show it is extremely challenging to recover MANPADS once they have been moved into the black market.
The US State Department’s MANPADS task force is an example of a successful program that attempts to prevent proliferation through securing stockpiles and destroying unneeded systems. It is an inter-agency program with support from the DoD, DHS, and TSA as well as other agencies. In addition, it has an international scope, involving collaboration with foreign governments and militaries. For instance, in 2003 and 2004 the task force worked with the Bosnian Government in destroying 6,000 unneeded MANPADS (Shapiro, 2012).
The task force was also active in stopping the proliferation of MANPADS during the Libyan Civil War through a joint operation with the British Government and the TNC (National Transitional Council). This involved teams searching through Libyan arm depots and bunkers during the conflict in an attempt to locate MANPADS. The operation resulted in the recovery of around 5,000 MANPADS (Shapiro, 2012). These efforts are expensive, however, and despite the success of the program a large number of the Libyan MANPADS were lost to various arms smugglers and non-state actors.
SMUGGLING AND THE BLACK MARKET:
In the international weapons trade, MANPADS rank as one of the most expensive weapon systems. Russian/Soviet systems are the most proliferated due to a large loss of Russian and ex-CIS stockpiles after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It’s estimated that 10% of existing MANPADS are not held in State armories but by various non-state actors, arms smugglers, or criminal organizations. The cost of MANPADS on the black market is very variable with estimates as low as $5,000 for a SA-7 to $160,000 for a Stinger (Buongiorno and Schroeder, 2010).
A significant proliferation of MANPADS is caused by instability. The collapse of Saddam Hussein’s government during the American invasion of Iraq led to around 5,000 MANPADS disappearing from Iraqi military stores (Schroeder, 2008). In more recent years the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s government in Libya after the Arab Spring lead to a significant proliferation of Libyan MANPADS, many of which were smuggled to Syria (Stewart, 2012).
Other sources of MANPADS are through corruption and graft. Unscrupulous elements of some third world militaries have been known to sell MANPADS as well as other weapons to arms dealers. Sudan is often implicated as the route through which the Chinese FN-6 system has appeared in Syria, given that it is the only country in the MENA to operate the FN-6. Furthermore, other non-MENA operators of MANPADS are unlikely sources due to distance from Syria as well as having less corrupt militaries. North Korea has also been implicated as a source of MANPADS proliferation though the extent of this is uncertain. Proliferation through graft and corruption while significant is largely dwarfed by proliferation that occurs as a result of instability (i.e. Libya, Iraq, Yemen, etc). Instability in one country often spreads to others leading to further proliferation of arms. Eritrea was implicated in transferring MANPADS to a Somali warlord in 2003 (Small Arms Survey, 2012). The Spanish Basque separatist group ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) has used MANPADS on multiple occasions (all unsuccessful) to attempt to down planes carrying the Spanish Prime Minister (the systems were likely supplied through Libya) (Small Arms Survey, 2012).
It is borderline impossible to account for MANPADS flows between countries due to the lack of publicly available information regarding those sales. That being said, known transfers between non-state actors and countries have occurred, though they are largely unquantifiable. Hezbollah is known to have received MANPADS from Iran. Hamas has likely received Iranian MANPADS as well (prior to the souring in relations between the two). In either case, it is clear that state to non-state transfers of MANPADS are occurring on a significant scale, however they are dwarfed by other types of proliferation.
CONCLUSION:
MANPADS remain one of the fundamental means by which non-state actors project force and attempt to nullify the key advantages states have in combating them. The path MANPADS take to end up in Syria is often a variable one, ranging from simply being captured from existing stockpiles to being smuggled in through the international arms market to direct transfers to non-state actors from states. MANPADS are one of the key factors in how the conflict in Syria evolves and progresses and are a significant variable that will decide how the conflict will end. The citations for this post are available in PDF form here.
