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The Economics of War: A Case Study on Jaish al-Islam

INTRODUCTION

Jaish al-Islam (Arabic: جيش الإسلام) or “Army of Islam” has a reputation for being a competent group. While the group is backed by Turkey and Saudi Arabia, its success cannot be wholly attributed to its foreign backing (Oweis, 2013). A variety of rebel groups in Syria ranging from the Southern Front of the Free Syrian Army to Ahrar al-Sham are backed by foreign powers, yet none of these groups have come close to emulating Jaish al-Islam’s (JaI) management of the local economy.

Ideologically the group adheres to Salafi Islamism, but they have shown a degree of flexibility in their outlook. Unlike al-Qaeda or ISIS, Jaish al-Islam does not seek to expand their rule to countries other than Syria. Furthermore, unlike Ahrar al-Sham, JaI has lukewarm relations with Jabhat al-Nusra  (al-Qaeda’s Syrian Branch). For instance, in June 2015, Jabhat al-Nusra’s attempt to expand their Jaish al-Fatah coalition to East Ghouta was rejected by JaI and other allied groups (Zaman al-Wasl, 2015). A month later in July, minor clashes between JaI and al-Nusra erupted in E. Ghouta over the arrests of a Nusra member by a local court (Abo_M0hamed, 2015; Uygaraktas, 2015). These clashes eventually were resolved only after several small attacks on each other’s checkpoints had occurred (Abduhark, 2015). While JaI and al-Nusra are not actively hostile to each other per se, these events highlight their somewhat uneasy relationship. Jaish al-Islam’s distance from al-Nusra makes the group somewhat more palatable for Saudi Arabia and Turkey to support.

UMC denies Nusra's call to form JaF
A Document from E. Ghouta ‘s United Military Council (including JaI) rejecting the creation of Jabhat al-Nusra’s Jaish al-Fatah coalition in E. Ghouta

JaI operates in a fairly tough environment in their stronghold of E. Ghouta; they are cut off from core rebel territories in Idlib/Aleppo Governorate and Darra Governorate. They are also under a crippling Syrian government siege that restricts the flow of supplies and food into their territories. Despite this situation, Jaish al-Islam manages to remain one of the most professional rebel groups in Syria. Jaish al-Islam’s management of the economy in E. Ghouta is a major factor in their continued survival while under siege.

Ammunition, food, water, weaponry, support population and funding are all required to successfully conduct military operations. Without these key factors, JaI would be unable to operate as successfully as they do. In this write-up we will be analyzing the various factors that allow Jaish al-Islam to survive in E. Ghouta on the doorstep of the Syrian government.


 SMUGGLING AND TUNNELING

Smuggling is a key factor in allowing Jaish al-Islam to survive under siege in East Ghouta. Bribery and graft within pro-government forces allows Jaish al-Islam to move goods into the East Ghouta pocket. Corrupt SAA (Syrian Arab Army) officers are known to sell supplies and weaponry to Jaish al-Islam at inflated rates. For instance, Jaish al-Islam bought two T-72 tanks from a corrupt SAA officer back in 2014 (Oryx, 2014). According to Siege Watch, in the Damascus area only Douma and Jobar are under complete siege with little to no transfer of goods and supplies from across government lines. However, the vast majority of the other sieges in E. Ghouta are not ranked as “Tier 1” sieges according to Siege Watch; this indicates that some passage of supplies from government areas into rebel areas occurs.

Jaish al-Islam also operates several underground smuggling tunnels in the area. The suburb of Jobar, for instance, is linked to E. Ghouta through a network of tunnels. These tunnels reduce the effectiveness of the near total government siege on Jobar. Other tunnel networks allow the transfer of supplies into E. Ghouta and allow Jaish al-Islam’s leadership to leave and enter the E. Ghouta pocket at will. For example, Jaish al-Islam’s former leader (now deceased) Zahran Alloush was able to travel from E. Ghouta to Istanbul, Turkey despite the Syrian government blockade. The network of tunnels crisscrossing under E. Ghouta makes it extremely hard for the Syrian government to totally blockade areas they are besieging.

Jaish al-Islam also uses tunneling as an offensive weapon to launch surprise attacks from behind enemy lines. The lead-up to the 2015 Tal Kurdi Offensive by Jaish al-Islam saw the construction of several infiltration tunnels. These tunnels are often large, well lit and equipped with air flow systems. Some tunnels were large enough to comfortably allow the transport of dozens of fighters.

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One of the Jaish al-Islam infiltration tunnels used to successfully attack from behind SAA lines in the 2015 Tal Kurdi Offensive

UNCONVENTIONAL ARTILLERY AND MUNITIONS MANUFACTURING

Jaish al-Islam makes a variety of munitions for use in combat. While most rebel groups in Syria are limited to manufacturing improvised items such as IEDs or homemade grenades, Jaish al-Islam takes this a step further to manufacturing standardized munitions. However, Jaish al-Islam does manufacture a variety of non-standard munitions including the infamous “hell cannon” (for more about “hell cannons” read this this). In summary, “hell cannons” are essentially an improvised mortar of sorts firing an improvised projectile usually consisting of a propane tank packed with explosives.

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A Jaish al-Islam “Hell Cannon” (note the usage of sandbags to reduce movement of the cannon during firing)

Jaish al-Islam also makes and uses improvised rocket artillery called IRAMs (Improvised Rocket Assisted Munitions). This style of improvised rocket artillery was popularized by various Shia militias that used them against American forces during the insurgency phase of the Iraq War (Roggio, 2008). IRAMs are essentially an oversized improvised warhead (usually a propane tank or drum filled with explosives and shrapnel) attached to a small rocket motor. When compared to most standard rocket artillery, IRAMs are relatively short range (mostly due to their large oversized warhead). They are also notoriously inaccurate due to their unconventional shape. IRAMs have a variety of names including “lob bombs” and aerial improvised explosive device (AIED). While Jaish al-Islam IRAMs tend to be less impressive and generally weaker than the infamous “volcano rockets” used by the SAA, IRAMs are still an important armament in Jaish al-Islam’s arsenal.

Jaish al-Islam IRAM
A Jaish al-Islam truck mounted with a dual IRAM system used to bombard the Syrian government controlled town of al-Zahraa in July, 2015
single IRAM
A Jaish al-Islam IRAM takes flight from a stationary metal platform

IEDs (improvised explosive device) are also a common non-standard munition utilized by Jaish al-Islam. Jaish al-Islam seems to employ IEDs in ambushes; they also use IEDs to shut down Syrian government usage of roads. For instance, Jaish al-Islam has repeatedly employed IEDs to try to shut down Syrian government usage of the M5 highway between Damascus and Homs. Jaish al-Islam does not seem to manufacture IEDs on a large scale. Furthermore, Jaish al-Islam does not appear to use IEDs at frequently as ISIS or other rebel groups.

Jaish al-Islam IED.png
Syrian government fighters walking into a Jaish al-Islam IED ambush (note the use of a surveillance camera to coordinate the ambush timing)
m5 ied
A Jaish al-Islam IED goes off on the M5 Highway

Improvised grenades are also manufactured by Jaish al-Islam. These improvised grenades are rather small and almost exclusively rely on an external fuse that must be manually lit with a lighter or match prior to usage. This style of improvised grenade is incredibly common across Syria among a variety of non-state actors ranging from small FSA groups to ISIS. The effectiveness of these improvised grenades is unclear due to the lack of standardization among grenade designs.

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A Jaish al-Islam fighter preparing to throw an improvised grenade near the outer walls of Adra Prison during Jaish al-Islam’s Tal Kurdi Offensive in September, 2015
Jaish al-Islam grenade
A Jaish al-Islam fighter about to throw a small improvised grenade

CONVENTIONAL ARTILLERY MANUFACTURING

While Jaish al-Islam’s IRAMs and hell cannons may be quite effective, Jaish al-Islam’s manufacturing of conventional artillery systems is what makes it stand out among the various rebel groups in Syria. Jaish al-Islam makes or modifies a variety of conventional artillery pieces that fire standard munitions. We will examine just a few of the conventional artillery pieces that have been modified or built by Jaish al-Islam.

Modification of existing artillery pieces by rebel groups in Syria is quite common. Jaish al-Islam modifies a variety of artillery systems. For instance, they have upgraded Type-63 MLRS (Multiple Lauch Rocket System) with a more durable off-road chassis as well as adding a new camouflage paint-job (Oryx Blog, 2014).

type 63 jaish al islam
Jaish al-Islam Type-63 107mm MLRS mounted on a modified off-road chassis (Oryx Blog, 2014)

Moving on to other types of rocket artillery, Jaish al-Islam has been spotted using a locally manufactured analog of the 9K132 Grad-P. This variant of the Grad is essentially a single tube that fires a single Grad rocket (FAS, 1999). This system allows for the firing of individual grad rockets in areas where a truck mounted grad system may not be useable. Jaish al-Islam’s Grad-P analog is extremely similar to the original system in both construction and design; furthermore, like the actual Grad-P, their Grad-P analog is man-portable.

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Jaish al-Islam setting up their Grad-P Analog somewhere in the mountains of Latakia

Probably one of the pinnacles of Jaish al-Islam’s artillery manufacturing was the creation of the Sahm al-Islam 3 (Arabic: سهم الإسلام) MLRS. “Sahm al-Islam” translates to “Arrow of Islam,” which is a somewhat apt name given the three 122mm rockets that system is armed with. These rockets are launched from an elevating and rotating firing platform that is mounted onto a 6×6 Ural-375D. The Ural-375D is the vehicle used in the BM-21 Grad MLRS; thus, its use as an MLRS platform in Jaish al-Islam’s Sahm al-Islam 3 system is not strange. The Sahm al-Islam 3 MLRS can also carry up to two 122mm rockets in reserve.

sahm al-Islam 3 MLRS Jaish al-Islam
Jaish al-Islam’s “Sahm al-Islam 3” MLRS

CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS MANUFACTURING

Jaish al-Islam makes a variety of conventional munitions as well. Jaish al-Islam used to control significant portions of Adra industrial city giving them access to significant amounts of machinery that could have been used for the production of munitions. Furthermore, there are a significant number of factories and foundries within Douma and other urban areas within East Ghouta.

Jaish al-Islam manufactures both mortar rounds and rockets. While they make a large variety of large and small caliber mortar rounds, they seem to only make 107mm and 122mm rockets. The 107mm rocket is seemingly designed to be fired from a Type-63 style MLRS. It is uncertain how effective or accurate these rockets are, though there are multiple videos from 2013 of their 122mm “Sahm al-Islam 3” rocket being successfully fired. It is unclear if these rockets are being produced on any significant scale by Jaish al-Islam. To the best of our knowledge, 122mm “Sahm al-Islam 3” rockets have not been seen since late 2013.

jai mortars
A variety of large and small Jaish al-Islam mortar rounds and a Jaish al-Islam 107mm rocket (Oryx Blog, 2014)

Unfortunately, we do not have insight on how these rockets are manufactured as we were unable to locate any videos of Jaish al-Islam manufacturing their rockets. However, Jaish al-Islam has released a video showcasing most of their process for manufacturing mortar rounds. The following slides roughly approximate the process they use to manufacture mortar rounds.

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Note that Jaish al-Islam uses sand casting to cast their mortar rounds; this is a standard process in the metal casting industry. It is likely that the group is employing workers that had experience with casting prior to the war. Several key steps of their manufacturing process are not shown; we do not know anything about the process of adding propellant, explosives, primers or fuzes to the mortar round. It is possible that they lack the capability to manufacture some or all of these components.


 GENERAL SUPPLIES MANUFACTURING

Jaish al-Islam appears to make their own uniforms. While this is not particularly unusual among non-state actors (the LTTE for instance made their own camouflage uniforms), it is not common for camouflage uniforms to be manufactured on a large scale among rebel groups in Syria. While all Jaish al-Islam fighters do not wear standardized uniforms, high level leadership and special forces tend to wear them. Jaish al-Islam not only makes camouflage pants and shirts, they also make standardized boots for their soldiers.

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A Jaish al-Islam run clothing factory in East Ghouta
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Jaish al-Islam fighters wearing standardized hats, uniforms and boots
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Boots being made at a Jaish al-Islam run factory

Jaish al-Islam also appears to make their own saline solution for usage as intravenous fluid in hospitals and on the battlefield. While the group does have a fairly well developed medical corp, we were unable to find any video footage showing the actual production process for saline. The video showcasing the saline solution did show the usage of a sterilizing machine, but it is unclear if that was relevant to the production of saline solution.

jaish al islam saline
Jaish al-Islam branded saline solution

ANTI-MATERIEL RIFLE AND SNIPER RIFLE MANUFACTURING

Jaish al-Islam manufactures a large variety of sniper and anti-materiel rifles. In addition to allowing the engagement of targets far outside the range of most small arms, these rifles can also easily destroy weaponry, supplies, and unarmored vehicles. The use of large caliber machine guns in a sniper role is not uncommon; the Vietnam war saw the use of the .50 Caliber Browning M2 machine gun as a sniper and the 12.7mm Soviet NSV machine gun was re-purposed as a sniper during the Soviet War in Afghanistan (Eger, 2013).

DSHK
A NSV machine gun being used in a sniper/anti-materiel role by Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan (Eger, 2013)

Jaish al-Islam seems to repurpose barrels from machine guns and anti-aircraft guns to make their anti-materiel rifles. These weapons seem to be effective and several videos have been released of them accurately targeting Syrian government forces. In some cases they appear to have manufactured the rifle barrel themselves, while in others they have simply reused a barrel from another weapon.

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A 23mm Jaish al-Islam anti-materiel rifle built using what appears to be the barrel of a ZU-32 Anti-Aircraft Gun (Oryx Blog, 2014)
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A 12.7mm Jaish al-Islam sniper rifle built with what appears to be a re-purposed Chinese W-85 heavy machine gun barrel
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A large caliber Jaish al-Islam gun fitted with a likely homemade muzzle break

AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

In Syria we have seen that siege tactics are a somewhat effective strategy to weaken the operational capability of a non-state actor. Both the Syrian government and the rebels have employed siege tactics through denying the passage of food, gasoline and other supplies to enemy controlled territory. Rebel held pockets under government blockade often face starvation and food insecurity. A particularly relevant example would be the Damascus suburb of Mouadamiya which is under a crippling government siege (Graham-Harrison and Shaheen, 2016). The “Mouadamiya Council,” which is in charge of running the city, has alleged that the government’s restriction of food supply to the suburb leads to much of the civilian population fleeing to government controlled areas. This also has the effect of weakening rebels who depend on the support of the civilian population to effectively operate.

E. Ghouta, however, has not experienced food insecurity or starvation to the scale seen in Mouadamiya. This is largely attributable to the rural nature of E. Ghouta and its enormous number of farms. Furthermore, Ghouta also benefits from having an enormous number of poultry farms and slaughter houses. On the other hand, urban areas under siege often can not produce sufficient food to feed its population. Therefore, Jaish al-Islam and other groups in E. Ghouta do not face the same food security pressures as rebels in besieged urban areas.

chicken farm
Aid workers from United Relief Office in East Ghouta prepare meat for distribution (East Ghouta is home to a variety of slaughter houses and poultry farms)

CONCLUSION

Jaish al-Islam is not your ordinary Syrian rebel group; while it may not have the large scale presence of Ahrar al-Sham or Jabhat al-Nusra, it is clearly one of the most well organized rebel groups in Syria. As far as conventional weapons and munitions manufacturing among non-state actors is concerned, Jaish al-Islam is by far the most successful at it. While it is quite clear that their heavy backing by Saudi Arabia and Turkey plays a significant role in their manufacturing capabilities, a large portion of the manufacturing equipment they use, such as forges, lathes and sterilization machines, are simply too large to have been smuggled in with the support of their foreign backers.

Jaish al-Islam’s management of the economy in East Ghouta plays a major role in the groups continued dominance among rebels in the Damascus area. Their ability to conduct massive coordinated offensives such as the 2015 Tal Kurdi Offensive is in part thanks to their ability to manufacture their own munitions. Jaish al-Islam is and will remain a major player within the Syrian Civil War for some time to come. Citations for this post are available in PDF form here.

Zahran Alloush’s Death and Its Effects on the Syrian Civil War

OVERVIEW:

On 25th December 2015, Zahran Alloush (the leader of Jaish al-Islam) was killed in a Syrian Air Force (SyAAF) airstrike on a meeting of senior rebel leadership in a Jaish al-Islam (JaI) HQ in East Ghouta (Hazem, 2015).

Zahran_Alloush,_Syria,_2015
Zahran Alloush at a Jaish al-Islam parade in April, 2015

The airstrikes were a targeted attack; unnamed SAA sources indicate that “Damascus knew about the location of the meeting 48 hours before it occurred” (Magnier, 2015). Furthermore, aerial footage of the airstrikes suggest that drones were used to monitor the meeting location (SANA, 2015). The footage suggests that the drone was an Orlan-10 (A Russian made surveillance drone), leading to speculation that this was a Russian airstrike. However, Russian media has confirmed that this was a Syrian operation and Syrian Government sources confirm this as well (RussiaToday, 2015; SANA, 2015). 

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SyAAF drone footage of the airstrikes (SANA, 2015)

THE CASUALTIES:

The airstrikes led to the deaths of 15 commanders in total in addition to Zahran Alloush; 7 belonging to Ahrar al-Sham and 8 to Jaish al-Islam and Faylaq al-Rahman (Syria24, 2015; Magnier, 2015).  The names of all the commanders are not known, however 2 key commanders are confirmed dead.

Abd al-Nasr Shmeir
Abdul Nasr Shmeir (Commander in Faylaq al-Rahman)
Mohammad Adam
Mohammad Adam (Advisor to Zahran Alloush in Jaish al-Islam)

Furthermore,  unconfirmed reports have surfaced that Zahran Alloush’s brother “Mahmoud,” and possibly his eldest son “Mohammad” were killed in the airstrikes (Magnier, 2015). Mahmoud was reportedly a deputy commander in Jaish al-Islam (Magnier, 2015). Contrary to initial reports, Jaish al-Islam’s spokesperson Hamza Biraqdar survived the airstrikes. The losses to JaI are severe with significant portions of its senior leadership killed; Faylaq al-Rahman’s leadership was also heavily affected by the airstrike (Lund, 2015). The losses to Ahrar al-Sham are less significant with only minor commanders killed.

THE IMPACT OF ALLOUSH’S DEATH:

Zahran Alloush was a key rebel leader not only in E. Ghouta but in Syria as a whole. Alloush had a media and political presence that was lacking among other Islamist groups in Syria. Alloush interacted with both western and local media, as well as traveling to Turkey in April, 2015 to meet with other rebel leaders to discuss the war in Syria. Many view Alloush as trying to tone down the sectarian rhetoric of Jaish al-Islam in an attempt to secure further backing from Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Interviews conducted with Alloush in May, 2015 (where he stated that he supports minority rights) contrast starkly with statements issued early in the year where he advocated for ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Syrian Alawite community (MPC Journal, 2015).

Jaish al-Islam has a fairly robust chain of command and is known for being extremely well organized compared to other rebel groups in Syria. Following the death of Alloush, JaI announced Issam al-Boudani (also known as “Abu Hammam Baidhani”) as their new leader. Not much is known about Boudani. His twitter account has been active since April, 2015 (though he tweets very infrequently). Unconfirmed sources suggest Boudani is a 40 year old ex-businessman from the Boudani neighborhood in Douma (DPA International, 2015). He was also very close to Alloush (reportedly Boudani was Alloush’s deputy) and had ties with the Muslim Brotherhood (DPA International, 2015).

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Issam al-Boudani in a JaI video release following Alloush’s death

It is uncertain if Boudani will take the group in a different direction than Alloush or if he can keep control of Jaish al-Islam at all. However, other rebel groups have rebounded from even more significant leadership losses. Ahrar al-Sham’s entire senior leadership was wiped out in 2014 (BBC, 2014). Despite this, the group managed to survive and become stronger in 2015. Jaish al-Islam’s chain of command is likely more organized than Ahrar’s (JaI has a reputation for being well structured and fairly professional). It is entirely unclear what effect these events will have on Saudi and Turkish backing of rebel groups.

CONCLUSION: 

The death of Alloush and others come at an extremely bad time for both Jaish al-Islam and the Syrian rebels as a whole. Syrian government offensives against the rebels have been fairly successful with the SAA gaining ground on many fronts. Furthermore, increased involvement of Russia in supporting the Syrian government through airstrikes, and lukewarm US support for FSA groups has put the rebels in a perilous position. The US appears to focusing more on supporting the SDF and defeating ISIS than forcing Assad out. Ultimately, unless Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other states increase support of rebel groups in Syria, the Syrian rebels will have a tough time holding their ground against the SAA. Citations for this post are available here for download in PDF form.

MANPADS in the Syrian Civil War

THE IMPORTANCE OF AIR DEFENSE:

One of the key advantages a conventional military has in fighting non-state actors is its air force. Airplanes, drones, and helicopters all act as massive force multipliers against ground forces through direct air to ground attacks (whether that is CAS or DAS). Aircraft can also act as a force multiplier through support functions such as logistics, intelligence gathering, troop transport and more. For a non-state actor, disrupting or otherwise degrading a state’s air force is often a key objective. There are many different methods that ground forces can employ to disrupting enemy air assets ranging from simple massed small arms fire to tripod mounted heavy machine guns (e.g. DShK) to anti-aircraft artillery (e.g. ZSU) to guided missile systems. Guided missile systems are particularly effective at degrading enemy air capabilities given their ability to strike air craft that are flying at altitudes above the range of unguided systems. There are a variety of anti-air systems ranging from hand held systems (e.g. Strela) to larger vehicle mounted systems (e.g. Buk). This article will focus primarily on the hand held surface-to-air missile systems (MANPADS) and their role in the Syrian Civil War.

WHAT ARE MANPADS?

MANPADS are a guided shoulder launched ground-to-air missile system that are primarily used to target low-flying aircraft (hence the name MAN-Portable Air-Defense Systems). Generally speaking MANPADS are usually carried by a dedicated anti-air team or are often found mounted on vehicles either as a standalone anti-air system (e.g. mounted on an unarmored truck). They can also be carried by dedicated anti-air vehicles (e.g. HS MO9 BOV-3). MANPADS can also be mounted on IFVs, Tanks, or APCs to give a basic air defense ability to vehicles that are generally at a disadvantage when facing aircraft.

 

SA-18 Unimog Mexican Navy
SA-18s mounted on a Mexican Navy Unimog truck (Elsa Eliuth, 2009)
HS MO9 BOV-3
HS MO9 BOV-3 Air Defense System with attached Strela MANPADS (Srdan Popovic, 2007)
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N. Korean Type-59 Tanks with mounted SA-16 MANPADS (Oryx Blog, 2014)

HOW ARE MANPADS GUIDED?

There are 3 main types of guidance systems for MANPADS, Infrared, Command Line-of-Sight, and Laser guided (Kirkham and Okechukwu, 2010).

Infrared (IR): IR systems operate by sensing the heat signature of an aircraft and then locking on to that heat signature. The missiles themselves do not send out any signal making them hard to detect when fired against aircraft. Countermeasure systems such as flares are often carried by aircraft to reduce the likelihood that the missile will hit its target. IR guidance systems are commonly referred to as “fire and forget” systems due to the missile’s internal guidance system entirely controlling the it’s flight path after launch. The vast majority of MANPADS systems in the hands of non-state actors are IR seeking.

SA-7
The IR Seeking Lens of a SA-7 (Lance. Cpl. Stephen Stewart USMC, 2012)

Command Line-of-Sight (CLOS): CLOS systems are directly controlled by the gunner who directs the missile to its target using an optical scope or magnified camera. These systems require highly trained and skilled operators and are extremely hard for aircraft to detect and avoid. However, aircraft can attempt to jam the data link between the missile and the operator using electronic warfare systems.

Blowpipe Missile
The British CLOS guided Blowpipe MANPADS (U.K. Ministry of Defense)

Laser Guided: Laser guided missiles follow a laser that the operator paints and tracks the aircraft with. This is one of the most effective systems given that most aircraft countermeasures will not stop the missile. However these systems are complex, expensive and are only usable by skilled air-defense teams. One downside of the system is that laser guidance can be adversely affected by weather conditions such as rain or smog that may degrade the laser beam strength.

Starstreak Missile
The British Laser Guided Starstreak System (U.K. Ministry of Defense, 2012)

 

MANPADS VARIANTS:

MANPADS are manufactured by a variety of countries including Russia/Soviet Union, China, the United States, France, the UK and many others (Kirkham and Okechukwu, 2010). This write-up will focus primarily on Russian/Soviet MANPADS as well as the Chinese FN-6. These are the primary systems that are proliferated and used in the Syrian Civil War as well as other conflicts around the world.

SA-7a Grail

Russian Name: 9K32 Strela-2

Designer: KBM Kolomna (USSR)

Production: 1968 – Present

Weight: 33.1 lbs

Length: 1.44 m

Maximum Firing Range: 3400 m

Warhead: 1.15 kg total, 370 g HE content

Detonation Mechanism: Impact and Grazing Fuse/Time Delayed Self-Destruct

Guidance System: Passive IR

Flight Ceiling: 1500 m

 

Overview:

The SA-7a Grail (Russian: Cтрела-2 “Arrow-2”), was the first system developed by the Soviet Union that fit the MANPADS role. The system suffered from several drawbacks, notably the small warhead failing to successfully destroy a jet as well as failing to hit fast aircraft moving at sharp angles relative to the missile operator (Chankin-Gould and Schroeder, 2004). These along with other issues (i.e. the poor IR Locking system) led to the development of the SA-7b (9K32M Strela-2M) which was introduced into service in 1970. The main differences were an increase to a 2300 m flight ceiling, as well as a range increase to 4200 m and general speed and guidance improvements (Chankin-Gould and Schroeder, 2004). The SA-7b’s warhead size remained the same and still had the issue of not being sufficiently lethal on impact with jets. It is not possible to visually distinguish between the SA-7a and SA-7b, making it extremely hard to determine which system is used in conflicts. The SA-7a Grail is operated by an enormous range of countries and non-state actors including the vast majority of countries in the MENA region.

SA-7a Components


SA-14 Gremlin

Russian Name: 9K34 Strela-3

Designer: KBM Kolomna (USSR)

Production: 1974 – Present

Weight: 35.3 lbs

Length: 1.47 m

Maximum Firing Range: 4100 m

Warhead: 1.17 kg total, 390 g HE content

Detonation Mechanism: Impact and Grazing Fuse/Time Delayed Self-Destruct

Guidance System: Passive IR

Flight Ceiling: 2300 m

 

Overview:

The SA-14 Gremlin (Russian: Стрела-3 “Arrow-3”) is the successor to SA-7b Grail system and was designed to rectify the issues faced by it. The system is very similar structurally to the SA-7a and SA-7b. The biggest difference would be improvements to the IR seeker head that improved target acquisition and missile accuracy. One key change is the inclusion of a battery cooling unit (BCU), which drastically improved the IR seeking capability through cooling the lead sulphide detector element with pressurized nitrogen gas (Pike, 1999). This allows for a larger range as well as better target acquisition of cooler aircraft. The increase in weight between the SA-7b and SA-14 is largely attributed to the heavier warhead which also lead to a slight decrease in speed. There were also reliability issues in regards to the compressed nitrogen in the battery cooling unit in harsh conditions.

SA-14 Components


SA-16 Gimlet

Russian Name: 9K310 Igla-1

Designer: KBM Mashinostroyeniya

Production: 1981-present

Weight: 37.5 lbs

Length: 1.574 m

Maximum Firing Range: 5,200 m

Detonation Mechanism: Impact and Grazing Fuse (Terminal Maneuver)/Time Delayed Self-Destruct

Guidance System: Passive IR

Flight Ceiling: 3500 m

 

Overview:

The SA-16 Gimlet (Russian: Игла́-1 “Needle”) is the successor to the SA-14 Gremlin and uses a different structural design. The system represented a significant improvement over the SA-14 in most areas. The Gimlet has an optional Identification Friend or Foe system (IFF) which prevented target acquisition of friendly aircraft (Pike, 1999). It also featured improved leading and elevation systems which simplified the shooting process. An eject motor was added which improved user safety and allowed for indoor usage. A terminal maneuver was also added which allowed the missile to hit the body of the aircraft rather than detonating against the jet nozzle. A secondary charge was added to detonate any remaining missile fuel upon hitting the target further increasing lethality. Improvements to the targeting system mainly consisted of having two separate detectors, one cooled detector that locks on to the target and another uncooled that detects flairs and other decoys (OnWar, 2015). The missile computer uses these dual detectors together to determine the flight path and counteract flares and jamming systems. An aerospike also was added to the nose of the missile which reduces shock wave and thus the amount of heat that contacts the IR lens of the missile (CAT:UXO, 2015). Overall the system was a significant improvement over the SA-14 Gremlin, but was essentially a simplified version of the SA-18.

SA-16 Components


SA-18 Grouse

Russian Name: 9K310 Igla

Designer: KBM Mashinostroyeniya

Production: 1983-present

Weight: 37.5 lbs

Length: 1.574 m

Maximum Firing Range: 5,200 m

Warhead: 1.17 kg total, 390 g HE content

Detonation Mechanism: Impact and Grazing Fuse (Terminal Maneuver)/Time Delayed Self-Destruct

Guidance System: Passive IR

Flight Ceiling: 3500 m

 

Overview:

The SA-18 Grouse (Russian: Игла́-1 “Needle”) is an improved version of the SA-16 Gimlet. The two systems are extremely similar both in appearance and in function. The key differences are improvements to the IR targeting system as well as the ability to engage aircraft moving at any angle and direction relative to the operator (Chankin-Gould and Schroeder, 2004). The system can also mount a night sight allowing for the engagement of aircraft during night, something that previous MANPADS generations were unable to do. The missile also has a slightly faster peak speed though time to target is ultimately similar.

SA-18 Components


FN-6

Chinese Name: FeiNu-6

Designer: China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation

Weight: 37.5 lbs

Length: 1.495 m

Maximum Firing Range: 5,800 m

Detonation Mechanism: Impact and Grazing Fuse (Terminal Maneuver)/Time Delayed Self-Destruct

Guidance System: Passive IR

Flight Ceiling: 4,000 m

 

Overview:

The FN-6 (Chinese: 飞弩 “Flying Crossbow”) is a third generation MANPADS developed by China for export. The domestic variant is known as HongYing-6 (Red Tassel-6). The system is heavily modular, allowing the attachment of optical sights, night vision sights, and 2 different types of IFF systems. The FN-6 is extremely effective at defeating air craft countermeasures and is capable of both tail chase and head on attacks (though it performs better at head on attacks). It is in use in a few countries around the world. Sudan (possibly South Sudan by extension) is the only country that operates the system in the MENA region (Reed, 2013).

FN-6 Components

 


MANPADS TACTICS AND STRATEGY:

MANPADS, despite their fire-and-forget nature, still require proper tactics as well as effective deployment in an overall strategy. Angle of attack is a significant issue in regards to MANPADS; usage at certain angles is not possible in earlier systems and reduces effectiveness in newer systems. For instance, missiles fired at targets that are moving perpendicularly to the MANPADS operator are less likely to hit than missiles fired from an oblique angle. Many systems are unable to target fast moving aircraft flying directly towards the MANPADS operator. The efficacy of engaging an aircraft at various angles varies greatly upon user skill, system variant, aircraft type and speed and so forth. Secondly, MANPADS that do not have an attachable night vision system are not usable during night. MANPADS with night vision systems are rarely seen in Syria, and as such aircraft are freer to operate at night than during the day.

angle of attack diagram
A diagram of targeting angles for tail-chase and head-on attack from an FN-6 operation manual

In conventional warfare, MANPADS are only one part of a complex multi-layered air defense grid. In Syria non-state actors rarely have access to advanced long range SAM systems (i.e. Buk or S-200) and thus MANPADS are often the longest range missile system that are used for air-defense. Other than MANPADS, non-state actors use anti-aircraft artillery systems such as ZSUs and ZPUs, as well as heavy machine gun fire to drive off jets and helicopters. Deployment of air defense teams is rarely well-coordinated given the low number of available air-defense assets for non-state actors (general lack of communication and clear command chains also plays a role). As such, MANPADS simply force aircraft to operate at higher altitudes and rely on nap-of-the-earth flight (for helicopters only), thus reducing the efficacy of airstrikes as well as degrading overall logistics and transport ability for aircraft.

Another issue that is fairly unique to Syria is the lack of parts for MANPADS. Non-state actors generally capture MANPADS from Syrian government stocks (which are often in poor condition) or smuggle in MANPADS from other countries. In either case, these systems are often missing key parts or are damaged. For non-state actors, significant problems with the trigger assembly, eject motor, missile or launching tube are generally not fixable; however issues with the batteries are addressable. Improvised battery replacements have been seen in MANPADS though it is unclear how effective they are. In MANPADS that have a BCU rather than a standard battery unit, the lack of cooling gas in any improvised battery will likely reduce the seeking and target acquisition capabilities of the system.

improvised battery in Syria
An improvised battery on an SA-7 in Syria (New York Times, 2014)

PROLIFERATION OF MANPADS:

MANPADS have generally not been supplied to non-state actors within Syria by the US due to concerns that they could fall into wrong hands and be used to strike at civilian aircraft. However there are allegations that limited transfers of MANPADS from Qatar and Saudi Arabia to various Syrian rebel groups have occurred (Schmitt, 2013). As such, there are two primary methods through which non-state actors in Syria acquire MANPADS: purchasing them on the black market and through directly capturing them from other groups (whether that is other non-state actors or the Syrian Government). Groups can also acquire MANPADS through direct transfers from governments, however this is a fairly rare occurrence. The vast majority of MANPADS are acquired through capturing them (mostly from the Syrian Government). However proliferation is also an important factor given the immense number of MANPADS that are available on the black market due to instability in the MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa.

One of the most famous examples of proliferation and a cautionary tale as to the risks of supplying non-state actors with MANPADS is the US supplying Stinger MANPADS to Afghan mujahedeen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Despite CIA oversight of the program, of the 1000 missile systems supplied several hundred were not accounted for. The CIA was given $10 million in funding to recover the missiles and a missile recovery program was launched in 1990, called Operation MIAS (Missing in Action Stingers). The initial $10 million was not enough, and the CIA requested $55 million from Congress only a few years later (Wright and Broeder, 1993). The program ultimately failed to reach its objective of re-buying the lost Stingers, highlighting the risks that states take when they supply MANPADS to non-state actors (Gupta, 1994).

afghan stinger
An Afghan Mujahid operating a CIA supplied Stinger (Getty Images, 1988)

 

Pulling MANPADS the systems off the black market is a much harder task than simply destroying the systems all together. As the failures of Operation MIAS show it is extremely challenging to recover MANPADS once they have been moved into the black market.

The US State Department’s MANPADS task force is an example of a successful program that attempts to prevent proliferation through securing stockpiles and destroying unneeded systems. It is an inter-agency program with support from the DoD, DHS, and TSA as well as other agencies. In addition, it has an international scope, involving collaboration with foreign governments and militaries. For instance, in 2003 and 2004 the task force worked with the Bosnian Government in destroying 6,000 unneeded MANPADS (Shapiro, 2012).

The task force was also active in stopping the proliferation of MANPADS during the Libyan Civil War through a joint operation with the British Government and the TNC (National Transitional Council). This involved teams searching through Libyan arm depots and bunkers during the conflict in an attempt to locate MANPADS. The operation resulted in the recovery of around 5,000 MANPADS (Shapiro, 2012). These efforts are expensive, however, and despite the success of the program a large number of the Libyan MANPADS were lost to various arms smugglers and non-state actors.

Joint operation burundi


SMUGGLING AND THE BLACK MARKET:

In the international weapons trade, MANPADS rank as one of the most expensive weapon systems. Russian/Soviet systems are the most proliferated due to a large loss of Russian and ex-CIS stockpiles after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It’s estimated that 10% of existing MANPADS are not held in State armories but by various non-state actors, arms smugglers, or criminal organizations. The cost of MANPADS on the black market is very variable with estimates as low as $5,000 for a SA-7 to $160,000 for a Stinger (Buongiorno and Schroeder, 2010).

A significant proliferation of MANPADS is caused by instability. The collapse of Saddam Hussein’s government during the American invasion of Iraq led to around 5,000 MANPADS disappearing from Iraqi military stores (Schroeder, 2008). In more recent years the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s government in Libya after the Arab Spring lead to a significant proliferation of Libyan MANPADS, many of which were smuggled to Syria (Stewart, 2012).

libyan manpads
A captured Libyan Stockpile of Anza Mk-II, SA-7b and SA-24 MANPADS (N.R. Jenzen-Jones, 2013)

Other sources of MANPADS are through corruption and graft. Unscrupulous elements of some third world militaries have been known to sell MANPADS as well as other weapons to arms dealers. Sudan is often implicated as the route through which the Chinese FN-6 system has appeared in Syria, given that it is the only country in the MENA to operate the FN-6. Furthermore, other non-MENA operators of MANPADS are unlikely sources due to distance from Syria as well as having less corrupt militaries. North Korea has also been implicated as a source of MANPADS proliferation though the extent of this is uncertain. Proliferation through graft and corruption while significant is largely dwarfed by proliferation that occurs as a result of instability (i.e. Libya, Iraq, Yemen, etc). Instability in one country often spreads to others leading to further proliferation of arms. Eritrea was implicated in transferring MANPADS to a Somali warlord in 2003 (Small Arms Survey, 2012). The Spanish Basque separatist group ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) has used MANPADS on multiple occasions (all unsuccessful) to attempt to down planes carrying the Spanish Prime Minister (the systems were likely supplied through Libya) (Small Arms Survey, 2012).

It is borderline impossible to account for MANPADS flows between countries due to the lack of publicly available information regarding those sales. That being said, known transfers between non-state actors and countries have occurred, though they are largely unquantifiable. Hezbollah is known to have received MANPADS from Iran. Hamas has likely received Iranian MANPADS as well (prior to the souring in relations between the two). In either case, it is clear that state to non-state transfers of MANPADS are occurring on a significant scale, however they are dwarfed by other types of proliferation.


CONCLUSION:

MANPADS remain one of the fundamental means by which non-state actors project force and attempt to nullify the key advantages states have in combating them. The path MANPADS take to end up in Syria is often a variable one, ranging from simply being captured from existing stockpiles to being smuggled in through the international arms market to direct transfers to non-state actors from states. MANPADS are one of the key factors in how the conflict in Syria evolves and progresses and are a significant variable that will decide how the conflict will end. The citations for this post are available in PDF form here.