INTRODUCTION:
Following our last write-up on ISIS affiliate Wilayat Khorasan (IS-K), the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated significantly. The US government added Wilayat Khorasan to its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Furthermore, Wilayat Khorasan has conducted attacks with increasing frequency and on a larger scale. On January 13th, 2016 IS-K attacked the Pakistani consulate in Jalalabad, Afghanistan in a complex multi-person suicide bombing. This is the first large scale IS-K attack in a major city in Afghanistan (the prior 2015 bombing of a bank in Jalalabad has not been 100% linked to IS-K).
Despite the heavy losses ISIS has been facing in Syria and Iraq (with the Iraqi Government recapturing nearly all of Ramadi from ISIS in December and January), ISIS growth has not ceased in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Estimates by the UK based Royal United Services Institute put IS-K numbers at 7,000-8,500 in Afghanistan and 2,000-3,000 in Pakistan. In this write-up we will be analyzing and mapping IS-K’s leadership structure.
WHERE IS WILAYAT KHORASAN’S LEADERSHIP COMING FROM?
The vast majority of IS-K leaders and fighters are former Afghan Taliban or former Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). A small number of fighters were previously linked to Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The fractured nature of both the Afghan Taliban and the TTP makes it fairly easy for IS-K to recruit commanders and fighters. In our previous write-up we discussed IS-K’s presence in Nangarhar and their general background and strategy in Afghanistan. While IS-K’s stronghold is still in Nangarhar and Kunar, IS-K is operating in a variety of provinces including Zabul and Ghazni.
It is not particularly challenging for IS-K to gain a presence in districts that are far flung from their core areas in Eastern Afghanistan. All it takes for an IS-K presence in a district is simply one or two Taliban commanders switching allegiance. As we will see in our analysis of the leadership structure none of IS-K’s leaders come from Syria or Iraq. Indeed, very few of IS-K’s leaders are even Afghan; the vast majority of its leadership is Pakistani.
WILAYAT KHORASAN’S LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE
HAFIZ SAEED KHAN
Alias: Mullah Saeed Orakzai
Age: 42
Position: Emir and Wali (governor) of Wilayat Khorasan
Place of Birth: Mamozai Town, Orakzai Agency, FATA, Pakistan
Former Allegiances: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Afghan Taliban
Status: Alive
About:
Not much is known about Hafiz Saeed Khan’s early life; however, he may have attended Dar-ul-Ulum Islamia (a madrasa in Hangu Town, Pakistan). After the US invasion of Afghanistan, Khan traveled into Afghanistan and joined the Afghan Taliban. He was reportedly in Kabul for 2 years during this time. At some point he became friends with Batiullah Mehsud (a Pakistani that was advising the Afghan Taliban in religious matters). In 2007, Batiullah Mehsud formed the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and made Khan an Emir and religious leader for Orakzai Agency, Pakistan. By 2009 Khan was the head of the TTP in Orakzai Agency as well as a local judge. Following Mehsud’s death and the fragmentation of the TTP, it would appear that Khan grew disillusioned with the TTP. He and several other ex-TTP commanders pledged allegiance to ISIS in October, 2014. Reports that he was killed in an American drone strike emerged in July, 2015. This has been denied by ISIS and interviews with him in Dabiq (ISIS’s English print magazine) suggest that he is alive.
SHEIKH KULZAMAN AL-FATEH
Alias: Gul Zaman
Position: 2nd in command to Hafiz Saeed Khan and Emir of Khyber Region
Former Allegiances: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
Status: Dead (Killed in US drone strike in July, 2015)
About:
Sheikh Kulzaman al-Fateh was a former TTP chief of Khyber Agency, Pakistan. He pledged allegiance to ISIS along with Hafiz Saeed Khan in October, 2014. He was reportedly 2nd in command to Hafiz Saeed Khan. Kulzaman was killed in a US drone strike in July along with Shahidullah Shahid (an ex-TTP spokesperson also part of IS-K). IS-K has not publicly announced a successor to Kulzaman.
KHALED MANSOUR
Position: Emir in Hangu District, Pakistan
Former Allegiances: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
Status: Alive
About:
Khaled Mansour (also known as Khalid Mansoor) is a former TTP chief of Hangu District, Pakistan. He pledged allegiance to ISIS along with Hafiz Saeed Khan in October, 2014.
MUFTI HASSAN SWATI
Position: Emir in Peshawar, Pakistan
Former Allegiances: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
Status: Alive
About:
Mufti Hassan Swati is a former head of the TTP in Peshawar. He was responsible for a suicide bombing that targeted a hotel in a Shia neighborhood in Peshawar in Feburary, 2014. Nine people were killed in that blast and 50 were injured. He pledged allegiance to ISIS along with Hafiz Saeed Khan in October, 2014.
TALHAH
Position: Emir in Lakki Marwat District, Pakistan
Former Allegiances: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
Status: Alive
About:
Talhah (likely an alias) is an Emir in Lakki Marwat District, Pakistan. He is most likely low level ex-TTP. It is possible he was a spokesperson for a TTP splinter group known as “TTP Tariq Group” at some point. He pledged allegiance to ISIS in January, 2015.
HAFIZ DOLAT KHAN
Alias: Hafiz Ahmed
Position: Emir in Kurram Agency
Former Allegiances: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
Status: Alive
About:
Dolat is a former TTP chief of Kurram agency (he was appointed to that role in May 2013). He was also responsible for a bomb blast targeting a JUI-F (A Pakistani Islamist political party) rally in Kurram agency during May of 2013. That blast led to the deaths of around 23 people. Dolat pledged allegiance to ISIS in January, 2015.
OBAIDULLAH PESHAWARI
Position: Emir of Tawad al-Jihad in Peshawar
Former Allegiances: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
Status: Alive
About:
Peshawari is the emir of Tawad al-Jihad. Tawad al-Jihad is a small TTP splinter group that mostly operated around Peshawar, Pakistan. Peshawari was likely in the TTP as well prior to its collapse. He pledged allegiance to ISIS in January, 2015.
SHEIKH ABU YAZID ABDUL QAHIR KHORASANI
Position: Unknown
Status: Alive
About:
Khorasani is the founder of Abtalul Islamic Foundation. Abtalul is an online forum and media group that supports jihadists and radical Islamism. His role in IS-K is unknown; however, Khorasani has significant experience with media, video editing, audio editing and filming. It is possible that Khorasani is managing IS-K’s propaganda. Abtalul’s website is currently down; it is uncertain if it was shutdown by him or by government authorities. His deputy “Jawaad” pledged allegiance to ISIS in his stead on January, 2015.
SHEIKH MUHSKIN
Position: Emir of Kunar Province
Former Allegiances: Afghan Taliban
Status: Alive
About:
One of the few Afghans in IS-K’s Leadership Sheikh Muhskin is the emir of Kunar Province. He pledged allegiance to ISIS in January, 2015.
UMAR AL-MANSOOR
Position: Unknown
Former Affiliation: Lal Masjid
Status: Alive
About:
Mansoor is from Lal Masjid a radical Islamist mosque and madrasa complex in Islamabad, Pakistan. The mosque has had a significant ties with jihadists dating all the way back to the 1980’s. Lal Masjid is infamous for being raided by the Pakistani government due to its anti-government activity. The mosque recently was embroiled in controversy again when elements within it voiced support of ISIS. While it is unclear what Mansoor’s role will be, it’s likely he will be involved in dealing with religious matters given his schooling at Lal Masjid.
ABDUL RAHIM MUSLIM DOST
Age: 56
Position: None (former recruiter)
Former Allegiance: Allegedly Jamat al-Dawa al-Quran, IS-K
Status: Alive
About:
Dost is notable for being a former Guantanamo Bay Detainee. He was captured on November, 2001 and released in 2005 with no charges held against him. He resurfaced in 2014 and pledged allegiance to ISIS. He was reportedly serving as a recruiter for ISIS in Afghanistan, but he denied being a commander in IS-K. He withdrew his allegiance to Hafiz Saeed Khan in October, 2015.
UTHMAN GHAZI
Alias: Usman Ghazi
Position: Emir of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Status: Unknown/Possibly Dead
About:
The nominal leader of IMU (IMU in reality is heavily splintered), Uthman Ghazi pledged allegiance to ISIS officially in July, 2015. Clashes between his group and local Taliban erupted soon after this. It is unclear to what extent IMU as a whole has followed him and joined IS-K. In some districts IMU are Taliban allies while in others they are IS-K allies. Fierce clashes between the Taliban and the IMU in Zabul Province may have lead to his death in January, 2016.
AHMED MARWAT
Position: Spokesperson and Likely Leader of Jundallah
Former Allegiance: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
Status: Alive
About:
Ahmed Marwat is the spokesperson and likely leader of the Pakistani Islamist group Jundallah. Jundallah pledged allegiance to ISIS in November, 2014. The group is responsible for a variety of attacks including the 2015 Karachi Bus shooting and the 2012 Kohistan Massacre. Jundallah is sectarian; many of their attacks target Shias and Christians. They conduct operations primarily in the core provinces of Pakistan including Punjab and Sindh. The group pledged allegiance to ISIS in November, 2014.
MANGAL BAGH AFRIDI
Alias: Haji Mangal Bagh
Position: Leader of Lashkar-e-Islam
Status: Alive
About:
Bagh is the leader of Lashkar-e-Islam (a small militant outfit originally based in Khyber Agency, Pakistan). He reportedly pledged allegiance to ISIS in January, 2016. A Lashkar-e-Islam and IS-K meeting in Achin district was hit by an airstrike in December, 2015. Lashkar-e-Islam reportedly has bases in Nazyan district of Nangarhar Province.
CONCLUSION:
This breakdown of the IS-K leadership structure reveals several key facts about Wilayat Khorasan. Firsly, the leadership structure is heavily Pakistani and heavily ex-TTP. Secondly, very few Afghans are present in the upper levels of the organization. The lack of Afghans in the leadership structure may hinder IS-K recruitment in Afghanistan. The leadership structure is largely Pashtun as well. IS-K likely will face challenges expanding to non-Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan as a result of this.
The ties between Lal Masjid and IS-K are a major concern and threat. Radical madrasas in Pakistan may serve as a nexus for IS-K recruitment in areas that have traditionally lacked a significant TTP presence. Lal Masjid in particular is known to have funneled jihadists into Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Pakistan also may serve as a hotbed for IS-K recruitment. Following Operation Zarb-e-Azb, an enormous number of Pashtuns fled the violence in the FATA and became IDPs within Pakistan. These IDPs largely moved to slums in Punjab and Sindh. These slums are poor and often have significant TTP and militant links. In Karachi police routinely raid slums to arrest TTP militants. The heavily fragmented TTP in the slums of Karachi may serve as a recruiting ground for IS-K. The Pakistani police are largely responsible for dealing with the militants in the slums of Karachi and Lahore. The police are largely ill-equipped for dealing with this threat due to poor funding, corruption and lack of training. Jundallah (now part of IS-K) largely operates in core Pakistani provinces rather than in the remote tribal areas; thus, IS-K may attempt to increase recruitment in those areas if their expansion in Afghanistan slows.
IS-K is an emerging threat in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their presence further challenges the already unstable Afghan government and risks bringing a fresh wave of violence to Pakistan. Further cooperation between the Afghan and Pakistani governments is required to successfully combat this threat. Furthermore, NATO’s Operation Resolute Support must ramp up the training of the Afghan National Security Forces, as well as offer assistance in countering ISIS propaganda. In our next write-up we will analyze IS-K’s propaganda, as well as compare and contrast it to the propaganda of the Afghan Taliban. A list of sources for this write-up are available upon request. Our previous write-up on this topic, “ISIS in Afghanistan Pt. 1: ISIS in Nangarhar Province,” can be read here.